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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 earlier in the day: “Said planes dropped leaflets which read as follows: Way to permanent peace causing this conflict between Japan and the U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know than unless the US has not oppressed Japan, this war has not been started stop Our mission is to end this war as fast as possible and in order to achieve this end we should cooperate with Japan fully un- quote.” Then: “ I 3:oo Reported by G-z that Fort Stotsenburg is being bombed”; and again-“ I 3: 00 Report received from Stotsenburg many bombers very high bombed Clark Field at I 2: 35 P.M.” It is not even certain that the record thus provided clears up the much debated question of just when the Japanese attack on Clark Field began, for there is rather specific evidence which argues for a time some fifteen minutes earlier. No clarification, moreover, is provided for the controversial question of why our bombers were caught, apparently without warning, on the ground. There is reason to believe that a warning message had reached Clark Field, but the warning evidently was not received by bomber personnel there. In response to a specific question from the Air Historical Office which indicated the existence of information that a warning had been sent and ac- knowledged by Clark Field, General Eubank under date of 5 August 1947 made the following statement: Information of the Japanese formation which attacked Clark Field about noon, 8 December 1941, was not received by the Bomber Command prior to tile attack. The formation was almost directly overhead at the time the air raid warning siren was sounded and the bombs began exploding a few seconds thereafter. One or two false air raid warning messages had been received earlier in the day.43 And there the question must be left. Colonel Campbell is emphatic in his recollection that a prior warning was both sent and acknowledged; General Eubank is equally emphatic in stating that no information reached V Bomber Command. It is entirely possible that both officers are correct in their recollection, but in the absence of further evidence there would appear to be little advantage in attempts to speculate on the probabilities of misinterpretation or other human failure that might reconcile the two accounts. In any case, the Japanese enjoyed the good fortune of catching the two squadrons of B-17’s on the ground at Clark Field. This had been the enemy’s hope when he originally scheduled an attack for the early morning, but after a postponement of several hours, he had no reason 2 I 0
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