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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
It required some time to bring in all of the bombers from patrol, but
shortly after I I 30 all American aircraft in the Philippines, with the
exception of one or two planes, were on the ground. Recently recalled
B-17’s at Clark were being made ready for the Formosa mission; 3 8
planes of the 20th Pursuit Squadron a t Clark and of the 17th a t Nichols
had returned to their bases for refueling; those of the 3d a t Iba, the
21st a t Nichols, and the 34th at Del Carmen stood ready to take off
upon receipt of ~ r d e r s . ~ ~ ~ A n djust about this time the plotting board at
Nielson Field began to receive reports of a formation of enemy air-
craft coming in over northern Luzon. Unlike other flights reported
that morning, this one did not break up as it proceeded south. Warn-
ing was sent to Clark Field by normal teletype channels, and according
to Col. A.H. Campbell, then chief of Aircraft Warning Service, its
receipt there was confirmed.*’ Back at Nielson, an entry in the Sum-
mary of Activities reads: “ I I : 37 Operations Board report flight of
enemy planes, number unknown now located about 70 miles west of
Lingayen Gulf, headed south I I: 2 7 A.M.” As soon as the enemy force
was believed to be within operating range of American pursuit planes,
Colonel George of V Interceptor Command took necessary steps to
provide protection for vital points.41 For the approaches to Manila,
the 17th Squadron was ordered to cover Bataan peninsula, the 2 1st to
patrol the Manila area itself, and the 34th to provide a cover for Clark
Field, where the zoth, just in from patrol, was being refueled. T h e 3d
Squadron, at Iba, was dispatched on what proved to be a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this point on, a confused record reflects chiefly the general
confusion and bad luck which attended the American air effort on
that first day of hostilities in the Philippines. The Summary of Activi-
ties for Headquarters, Far East Air Force, notes: “11:56 General
Brereton communicated with General Sutherland and complete report
was given General Sutherland of the air situation a t this time including
fact that it was planned to move the B-17’s now at Del Monte to San
Marcelino and to bomb Taiwan fields a t late afternoon today.” Then
the summary jumps to 1240 to record a report that “10 planes, 6,000
feet, nationality unknown, headed for Manila. This information from
the Navy.” Under 1255 appears another report that “large force of
planes, about 25, heading south reported in vicinity of Tarlac at
12:~s.”Under 1257 one reads of a Japanese propaganda mission
209

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.