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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
It is General Brereton’s recollection that shortly before 1010he
received authority to undertake a reconnaissance mission to Formosa;
that Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank, bomber commander, promptly took
off from Nielson for Clark Field to assume personal direction of the
preparations; that Colonel Eubank on his arrival at Clark recalled the
bombers from patrol to prepare for the execution of orders which
called for three planes to fly the reconnaissance mission “and the rest
to be briefed for an attack”; that, a t about 1100, GHQ authorized
bombing missions; that he then instructed Eubank to load all available
B-17’s with 100- and 300-lb. bombs and to brief the crews for attack
of airdromes in southwest Formosa; and that he ordered the two
squadrons of bombers at Del Monte to move their B-17’s a t dusk to
San Marcelino, a pasture-like emergency field lying near the coast of
Luzon west of Clark, whence they were to proceed during the night
to Clark Field as a staging point for a mission at da~break.~’It is
with more than ordinary interest, therefore, that one reads the fol-
lowing entries in the daily summary:
10:10 Colonel Eubank left for Clark Field to take charge of operations from
Clark Field with instructions to dispatch a photo reconnaissance mission in
force at once to southern Taiwan area.
General Brereton received a telephone call from General MacArthur.
General Brereton stated that since the attack was not made on Clark Field that
bombers will be held in readiness until receipt of reports from reconnaissance
missions. Lacking report of reconnaissance, Taiwan would be attacked in late
afternoon. The decision for offensive action was left to General Brereton. All
bombers were ordered to arm and be on alert for immediate orders.
IO:ZO Report of planes coming south proved erroneous. Planes reported
coming south from Cagayan Valley turned around and are now proceeding
north. The staff was called in and informed of General Brereton’s telephone
conversation with General MacArthur. General Brereton directed that a plan
of employment of our Air Force against known airdromes in Southern Formosa
be prepared.
10:45 Employment of Air Force directed by General Brereton as follows:
Two ( 2 ) heavy bombardment squadrons to attack known airdromes in
Southern Formosa at the latest daylight hour today that visibility will permit.
Forces to be z squadrons of B-I 7’s. Two ( 2 ) squadrons of pursuit to be on the
alert to cover operations of bombardment. Pursuit to be used to fullest extent
to insure safety of bombardment. Two ( 2 ) squadrons of bombardment to San
Mencilino [sic] at dusk. To Clark Field after dark prepared for operations at
daybreak.
I I :10 Report received from Clark Field that airdrome had not been bombed.
II:ZO Field Order No. One, confirming Colonel Eubanks instructions to
10:14
19th Bombardment Group sent by teletype.
2 0 8

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.