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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 It is General Brereton’s recollection that shortly before 1010he received authority to undertake a reconnaissance mission to Formosa; that Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank, bomber commander, promptly took off from Nielson for Clark Field to assume personal direction of the preparations; that Colonel Eubank on his arrival at Clark recalled the bombers from patrol to prepare for the execution of orders which called for three planes to fly the reconnaissance mission “and the rest to be briefed for an attack”; that, a t about 1100, GHQ authorized bombing missions; that he then instructed Eubank to load all available B-17’s with 100- and 300-lb. bombs and to brief the crews for attack of airdromes in southwest Formosa; and that he ordered the two squadrons of bombers at Del Monte to move their B-17’s a t dusk to San Marcelino, a pasture-like emergency field lying near the coast of Luzon west of Clark, whence they were to proceed during the night to Clark Field as a staging point for a mission at da~break.~’It is with more than ordinary interest, therefore, that one reads the fol- lowing entries in the daily summary: 10:10 Colonel Eubank left for Clark Field to take charge of operations from Clark Field with instructions to dispatch a photo reconnaissance mission in force at once to southern Taiwan area. General Brereton received a telephone call from General MacArthur. General Brereton stated that since the attack was not made on Clark Field that bombers will be held in readiness until receipt of reports from reconnaissance missions. Lacking report of reconnaissance, Taiwan would be attacked in late afternoon. The decision for offensive action was left to General Brereton. All bombers were ordered to arm and be on alert for immediate orders. IO:ZO Report of planes coming south proved erroneous. Planes reported coming south from Cagayan Valley turned around and are now proceeding north. The staff was called in and informed of General Brereton’s telephone conversation with General MacArthur. General Brereton directed that a plan of employment of our Air Force against known airdromes in Southern Formosa be prepared. 10:45 Employment of Air Force directed by General Brereton as follows: Two ( 2 ) heavy bombardment squadrons to attack known airdromes in Southern Formosa at the latest daylight hour today that visibility will permit. Forces to be z squadrons of B-I 7’s. Two ( 2 ) squadrons of pursuit to be on the alert to cover operations of bombardment. Pursuit to be used to fullest extent to insure safety of bombardment. Two ( 2 ) squadrons of bombardment to San Mencilino [sic] at dusk. To Clark Field after dark prepared for operations at daybreak. I I :10 Report received from Clark Field that airdrome had not been bombed. II:ZO Field Order No. One, confirming Colonel Eubanks instructions to 10:14 19th Bombardment Group sent by teletype. 2 0 8
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