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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 258 …order to achieve this end we should cooperate with Japan fully un- quote.” Then: “ I 3…
  • p. 345 …seater aircraft operated by inexperienced personnel in cooperation with antiaircraft search- lights.” la‘ Many important objectives…
  • p. 425 …with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation,” * the ARCADIA conference of the British and American…
  • p. 566 …joined at Dinjan by Col. Merian C. Cooper. The task confronting them, to say the le…
  • p. 596 …There had even been talk of “mutual cooperation” rather than “unity of command.” Some firm decision…
  • p. 629 …the British Isles, to “operate independently in cooperation with the British Bomber Command.” l o Detailed…
  • p. 679 …the fullest agreement with the methods of cooperation which you propose and supremely confident that, at…
  • p. 793 …1942. 36. Ibid. 37. Col. Merian C. Cooper, Briefing 7'8 Officer, First Special Aviation Project…
  • p. 802 …Mar. 1943; talk by Col. M.C. Cooper in Gen. Johnson's Staff Meeting, 2 3…
  • p. 846 …5 5 2 Coolidge, President, 25, 28 Cooper, Col. M.C., 499 Coral Sea. Battle of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
It is General Brereton’s recollection that shortly before 1010he
received authority to undertake a reconnaissance mission to Formosa;
that Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank, bomber commander, promptly took
off from Nielson for Clark Field to assume personal direction of the
preparations; that Colonel Eubank on his arrival at Clark recalled the
bombers from patrol to prepare for the execution of orders which
called for three planes to fly the reconnaissance mission “and the rest
to be briefed for an attack”; that, a t about 1100, GHQ authorized
bombing missions; that he then instructed Eubank to load all available
B-17’s with 100- and 300-lb. bombs and to brief the crews for attack
of airdromes in southwest Formosa; and that he ordered the two
squadrons of bombers at Del Monte to move their B-17’s a t dusk to
San Marcelino, a pasture-like emergency field lying near the coast of
Luzon west of Clark, whence they were to proceed during the night
to Clark Field as a staging point for a mission at da~break.~’It is
with more than ordinary interest, therefore, that one reads the fol-
lowing entries in the daily summary:
10:10 Colonel Eubank left for Clark Field to take charge of operations from
Clark Field with instructions to dispatch a photo reconnaissance mission in
force at once to southern Taiwan area.
General Brereton received a telephone call from General MacArthur.
General Brereton stated that since the attack was not made on Clark Field that
bombers will be held in readiness until receipt of reports from reconnaissance
missions. Lacking report of reconnaissance, Taiwan would be attacked in late
afternoon. The decision for offensive action was left to General Brereton. All
bombers were ordered to arm and be on alert for immediate orders.
IO:ZO Report of planes coming south proved erroneous. Planes reported
coming south from Cagayan Valley turned around and are now proceeding
north. The staff was called in and informed of General Brereton’s telephone
conversation with General MacArthur. General Brereton directed that a plan
of employment of our Air Force against known airdromes in Southern Formosa
be prepared.
10:45 Employment of Air Force directed by General Brereton as follows:
Two ( 2 ) heavy bombardment squadrons to attack known airdromes in
Southern Formosa at the latest daylight hour today that visibility will permit.
Forces to be z squadrons of B-I 7’s. Two ( 2 ) squadrons of pursuit to be on the
alert to cover operations of bombardment. Pursuit to be used to fullest extent
to insure safety of bombardment. Two ( 2 ) squadrons of bombardment to San
Mencilino [sic] at dusk. To Clark Field after dark prepared for operations at
daybreak.
I I :10 Report received from Clark Field that airdrome had not been bombed.
II:ZO Field Order No. One, confirming Colonel Eubanks instructions to
10:14
19th Bombardment Group sent by teletype.
2 0 8

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.