“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I t
It is difficult even to establish the chronology of events for that
morning or to give anything more than the approximate time of those
events on which agreement exists. The most detailed general account
is that of Brereton, and for much of the detail given by him there exists
independent orr rob oration.^^ O n the main points a t issue, moreover,
support for much of his account is provided without complete agree-
ment by a file of the daily Summary of Activities of the Headquarters,
Far East Air Force, extending from 8 December 1941to 2 4 February
1942, when General Brereton relinquished command in Java on the
eve of his departure for India to assume command of American air
operations in that area. These daily summaries leave little if any ques-
tion that they represent a detailed record compiled closer to the
events described than any comprehensive account known to exist. In
the following narrative they have been weighted accordingly.*
After his early morning report to General Headquarters, General
Brereton states that he returned to his own headquarters a t Nielson
‘These summaries acquire in the absence of other comparable records such an
importance as to justify at this point an attempt to describe them and the way in
which they reached the files of the Air Historical Office. They were transmitted to
that office after the termination of hostilities by AAF historical officers assigned to
the China-Burma-India theater. Presumably, they represent a record carried to India
by General Brereton or b other FEAF personnel who accompanied him to India, and
presumably they were l e J there at the time of his hurried departure in June 1942 for
the Middle East. (See below, p . 512-13.) Similar1 , records of early activity in India
reached the Air Historical Of&e through the e L r t s of the historical officer of the
Ninth Air Force, which General Brereton later commanded in ETO. The FEAF
summaries, which are typed out on loose sheets of two different sizes and of varying
weight and texture, all of them carbon copies except for the inserted notes of a stag
conference held on 19 December, are bound together by an acco fastener within an
ordinary manila cover. O n the cover has been written in ink, possibly by historical
personnel in the theater, “Early History 10th AAF”; but that has been struck out and
in its place appears “General Brereton’s Headquarters diary 8 Dec 41-24 Feb 42,” and
below that in pencil is written “Activity Report of FEAF.” Other markings were
apparently made by the filing personnel of the historical office. The historian is given
some pause by the fact that the daily summaries from 8 December through 13
December give the year as 1942 with corrections in ink for 8, 9, and 10 December.
The year appears without change as 1941for 14 December at which point the weight
of the paper changes, but reverts thereafter to 1942 until the entries for 16 December.
From that date forward the year is rendered correctly in the original typing. Since
one often writes by mistake the preceding year but rarely if ever puts down the new
year ahead of time, the likelihood that entries for the earlier dates were compiled at
some later time must be considered. Perhaps they represent a compilation taken from
available records for assistance in the preparation of such a report as is understood to
have been made by General Brereton in late January or early February (see note 3 2 ) ;
perhaps they are copies made from the original by a careless typist; perhaps there is
some other explanation. Whatever the case, the fullness and exactness of detail given,
together with the fact that at so many points independent corroboration can be had,
lead to the conclusion that the document represents a valuable record compiled closer
to the events described than any other known source of comparable scope.
206