“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I t
It is difficult even to establish the chronology of events for that
morning or to give anything more than the approximate time of those
events on which agreement exists. The most detailed general account
is that of Brereton, and for much of the detail given by him there exists
independent orr rob oration.^^ O n the main points a t issue, moreover,
support for much of his account is provided without complete agree-
ment by a file of the daily Summary of Activities of the Headquarters,
Far East Air Force, extending from 8 December 1941to 2 4 February
1942, when General Brereton relinquished command in Java on the
eve of his departure for India to assume command of American air
operations in that area. These daily summaries leave little if any ques-
tion that they represent a detailed record compiled closer to the
events described than any comprehensive account known to exist. In
the following narrative they have been weighted accordingly.*
After his early morning report to General Headquarters, General
Brereton states that he returned to his own headquarters a t Nielson
‘These summaries acquire in the absence of other comparable records such an
importance as to justify at this point an attempt to describe them and the way in
which they reached the files of the Air Historical Office. They were transmitted to
that office after the termination of hostilities by AAF historical officers assigned to
the China-Burma-India theater. Presumably, they represent a record carried to India
by General Brereton or b other FEAF personnel who accompanied him to India, and
presumably they were l e J there at the time of his hurried departure in June 1942 for
the Middle East. (See below, p . 512-13.) Similar1 , records of early activity in India
reached the Air Historical Of&e through the e L r t s of the historical officer of the
Ninth Air Force, which General Brereton later commanded in ETO. The FEAF
summaries, which are typed out on loose sheets of two different sizes and of varying
weight and texture, all of them carbon copies except for the inserted notes of a stag
conference held on 19 December, are bound together by an acco fastener within an
ordinary manila cover. O n the cover has been written in ink, possibly by historical
personnel in the theater, “Early History 10th AAF”; but that has been struck out and
in its place appears “General Brereton’s Headquarters diary 8 Dec 41-24 Feb 42,” and
below that in pencil is written “Activity Report of FEAF.” Other markings were
apparently made by the filing personnel of the historical office. The historian is given
some pause by the fact that the daily summaries from 8 December through 13
December give the year as 1942 with corrections in ink for 8, 9, and 10 December.
The year appears without change as 1941for 14 December at which point the weight
of the paper changes, but reverts thereafter to 1942 until the entries for 16 December.
From that date forward the year is rendered correctly in the original typing. Since
one often writes by mistake the preceding year but rarely if ever puts down the new
year ahead of time, the likelihood that entries for the earlier dates were compiled at
some later time must be considered. Perhaps they represent a compilation taken from
available records for assistance in the preparation of such a report as is understood to
have been made by General Brereton in late January or early February (see note 3 2 ) ;
perhaps they are copies made from the original by a careless typist; perhaps there is
some other explanation. Whatever the case, the fullness and exactness of detail given,
together with the fact that at so many points independent corroboration can be had,
lead to the conclusion that the document represents a valuable record compiled closer
to the events described than any other known source of comparable scope.
206