The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
for the first time General Brereton publicly stated the facts as he
recalled them, General MacArthur announced that he had received
no such recommendation and that prior to that publication he knew
“nothing of such a recommendation having been made.” ’This state-
ment lent special weight to the testimony of General Sutherland, who
during the preceding year had stated in an interview that the responsi-
bility for holding the bombers on the ground that morning was
entirely Breret0n’s.t It was Sutherland’s recollection that the air
commander agreed that there would be no point in attempting a
bomber mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an immediate reconnaissance mis-
sion was considered, but General Brereton, in reply to a request for
information on that point, has indicated that no authorization for
reconnaissance was received until later. “At the first conference,” he
wrote, “General Sutherland approved my plans for an attack imme-
diately after daylight, instructed me to go ahead with preparations and
that in the meantime, he would obtain General MacArthur’s authority
for the daylight attack.” 3 1
* T h e Brereton Diaries (New York, 1946); MacArthur’s statement of 2 7 Sept. 1946,
in N e w York Times, 28 Sept. 1946. In response to a request for information, General
Brereton several months earlier had given the Historical Office a statement of develo
ments on the first day of war that was substantially the same as that subsequentri
published. (1st ind., Brereton to Paul [ltr., Chief, AAF Historical Office to C G Third
Air Force, sub.: Air Defense of the Philippine Islands in December 1941,30 Jan. 19461.)
t The record of an interview by Walter D. Edmonds with Lt. Gen. Richard K.
Sutherland in Manila on 4 June 194s (copy supplied the author through the courtesy
of Mr. Edmonds) reads on the question of “Why was Formosa not bombed?” as
follows:
Gen. Sutherland began by saying that all the B-17s had been ordered to Del Monte
some days before. On a check it was found that only half had been sent. GHQ
wanted the planes in Del Monte because they would there have been safe from
initial Jap attacks-they could not have been reached at all-and they could them-
selves have staged out of Clark Field to bomb Formosa. This direct order had not
been obeyed. And it must be remembered that GHQ gave out general orders and
that the AFHq were supposed to execute them. As Sutherland recalls, there was
some plan to bomb Formosa, but Brereton said that he had to have Photos first.
That there was no sense in going up there to bomb without knowing what they
were going after. There were some 25 fields on Formosa. On December 9th and
roth, photo missions were dispatched-Carpenter going on the first and returning
with generator trouble; Connally going on the second but being turned back by
fighters. Holding the bombers at Clark Field that first day was entirely due t o
Brereton. (Italics mine, WDE.)
General Sutherland’s statement that all B-17’s had been ordered to Del Monte (sub-
sequently confirmed in MacArthur’s statement of September 1946) and General
Brereton’s account of the move have been discussed above in Chap. 5 , pp. 188-89.
On the immediate question of the employment of the planes at Clark Field on 8
December, the question of a prior order for their transfer is a side issue.
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