“The Advance”60+ pages
- p. 14 …But the final choice remained with the commanding general,
who in some instances moved in advance…
- p. 36 …sufficiently advanced to support limited offensives in both the
European and the Pacific theaters.
The history…
- p. 40 …Advanced training was for the most part scheduled for overseas
schools, where combat experience of the…
- p. 43 …Of 2 , 9 2 5 planes reaching the AEF’s Zone of
Advance during the war…
- p. 45 …Trenchard, then com-
mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by
his advanced…
- p. 46 …the Zone of Advance,
the I Corps, the First Army, and the First Army Group, advancing…
- p. 47 …The rest of his offensive forces Mitchell concentrated along the axis
of the American advance. Since…
- p. 51 …among
the several armies.’ Aviation officers had to accept this concept, but
the most advanced thought…
- p. 63 …Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced
ideas of the Army’s…
- p. 68 …on the details of aerial combat, they
seldom represent the most advanced thought within the Army…
- p. 70 …to have been geared
closely to the advance of the ground armies. His boldest plan, a…
- p. 71 …the field of battle of either armies or navies.“
But this unpleasant thought was advanced as…
- p. 76 …who might provide
advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air…
- p. 87 …the doctrine of air war taught in the Air
Corps’ most advanced school a t the…
- p. 88 …One was the acquisition of more advanced bases. That
was a political matter, wholly foreign to…
- p. 91 …the years immediately follow-
ing the war, when as yet commercial aviation had not advanced to…
- p. 93 …the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing
gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made…
- p. 96 …mission of
coastal defense and that the proposal was advanced under circum-
stances decidedly favorable to…
- p. 112 …Numerous forecasts of such a development had been
voiced since the end of the earlier conflict…
- p. 117 …In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being…
- p. 119 …in the organization of their air
forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese…
- p. 122 …Force, the aviation department sought to promote the
growth of “civilian” airlines, the advancement of aeronautical…
- p. 125 …Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved
to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices…
- p. 126 …The Lufnvaffe was used both to eliminate the air opposition and as
an advance striking force…
- p. 127 …Leading the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions through the Low
Countries, the Stukas bombed troop concentrations and…
- p. 129 …supply resulting from the
speed of the German advance, the success of the RAF at Dunkirk…
- p. 131 …By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German
forces had destroyed all effective…
- p. 134 …After seizing key airdromes, the advance German forces
were supplied and reinforced by Junkers 5 2…
- p. 135 …In addition, the rapid German advance dis-
rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a…
- p. 149 …the best
flying weather and each including a number, steadily growing, of
basic and advanced Responsibility…
- p. 161 …miles to the
That attack argued too for the next eastward advance of the Ameri-
can…
- p. 164 …islands, proved inadequate against the
Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be…
- p. 165 …the United States and Alaska. And, as elsewhere,
protection of Alaska called for more advanced outposts…
- p. 170 …New estimates, submitted in &/lay by the W a r Plans Division
of the General Staff…
- p. 183 …T h e
British chiefs of staff did not envisage the use of the vast numbers…
- p. 198 …so far advanced as
those in Newfoundland. Surveys which were made during the spring
and summer…
- p. 201 …32
The organization of the Caribbean Air Force represented a marked
structural advance over the force…
- p. 204 …Of the several outlying sites in the eastern Caribbean, Puerto Rico
presented the most advanced stage…
- p. 211 …advanced bases, a series of inter-
mediate airfields, a chain of fields between Anchorage and the…
- p. 213 …the requirements for accommodating a pursuit group in the same
area.51These moves had not advanced…
- p. 217 …of the Navy to maintain
the long-range reconnaissance that would be required for advance
notice…
- p. 226 …The Interceptor Command was composed of the 24th Pursuit Group,
whose pilots had received advanced training…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 251 …execution of the plan for an early morning attack, and gave the
Americans advance notice of…
- p. 253 …mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an…
- p. 274 …the steady advance of the enemy from the north and addi-
tional landings along the Luzon…
- p. 278 …in advance of the scheduled
date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were…
- p. 281 …and the disposition of Air Corps troops
in advance thereof in order to accomplish your assigned…
- p. 282 …Shanghai to acquire
advanced bases; (b) by exerting slow pressure through the Nether-
lands East Indies…
- p. 291 …These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu-
tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance…
- p. 327 …than “a cadre sent to the territory in
advance of the main body.” 32 T o…
- p. 334 …the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two
theories to account for the…
- p. 335 …between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army…
- p. 337 …It would be necessary to know in advance of the approach of
enemy craft. Next, there…
- p. 338 …time proved less
effective,lo4 for advance warning of the enemy's approach did little
good…
- p. 350 …the Pacific coast defense
zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide
advance warning…
- p. 358 …Prospects for completing the
work in advance of an anticipated spring attack on Dutch Harbor
were…
- p. 397 …his staff to work out in advance details for the staging
+ See below, p. 493.
34'
- p. 399 …an advance task force of engineer, coast artillery, and general
service troops arrived in the waters…
- p. 403 …T e n
enlisted weather specialists accompanied the American advance task
force into southern Greenland in…
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
for the first time General Brereton publicly stated the facts as he
recalled them, General MacArthur announced that he had received
no such recommendation and that prior to that publication he knew
“nothing of such a recommendation having been made.” ’This state-
ment lent special weight to the testimony of General Sutherland, who
during the preceding year had stated in an interview that the responsi-
bility for holding the bombers on the ground that morning was
entirely Breret0n’s.t It was Sutherland’s recollection that the air
commander agreed that there would be no point in attempting a
bomber mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an immediate reconnaissance mis-
sion was considered, but General Brereton, in reply to a request for
information on that point, has indicated that no authorization for
reconnaissance was received until later. “At the first conference,” he
wrote, “General Sutherland approved my plans for an attack imme-
diately after daylight, instructed me to go ahead with preparations and
that in the meantime, he would obtain General MacArthur’s authority
for the daylight attack.” 3 1
* T h e Brereton Diaries (New York, 1946); MacArthur’s statement of 2 7 Sept. 1946,
in N e w York Times, 28 Sept. 1946. In response to a request for information, General
Brereton several months earlier had given the Historical Office a statement of develo
ments on the first day of war that was substantially the same as that subsequentri
published. (1st ind., Brereton to Paul [ltr., Chief, AAF Historical Office to C G Third
Air Force, sub.: Air Defense of the Philippine Islands in December 1941,30 Jan. 19461.)
t The record of an interview by Walter D. Edmonds with Lt. Gen. Richard K.
Sutherland in Manila on 4 June 194s (copy supplied the author through the courtesy
of Mr. Edmonds) reads on the question of “Why was Formosa not bombed?” as
follows:
Gen. Sutherland began by saying that all the B-17s had been ordered to Del Monte
some days before. On a check it was found that only half had been sent. GHQ
wanted the planes in Del Monte because they would there have been safe from
initial Jap attacks-they could not have been reached at all-and they could them-
selves have staged out of Clark Field to bomb Formosa. This direct order had not
been obeyed. And it must be remembered that GHQ gave out general orders and
that the AFHq were supposed to execute them. As Sutherland recalls, there was
some plan to bomb Formosa, but Brereton said that he had to have Photos first.
That there was no sense in going up there to bomb without knowing what they
were going after. There were some 25 fields on Formosa. On December 9th and
roth, photo missions were dispatched-Carpenter going on the first and returning
with generator trouble; Connally going on the second but being turned back by
fighters. Holding the bombers at Clark Field that first day was entirely due t o
Brereton. (Italics mine, WDE.)
General Sutherland’s statement that all B-17’s had been ordered to Del Monte (sub-
sequently confirmed in MacArthur’s statement of September 1946) and General
Brereton’s account of the move have been discussed above in Chap. 5 , pp. 188-89.
On the immediate question of the employment of the planes at Clark Field on 8
December, the question of a prior order for their transfer is a side issue.
2 0 5