“Roosevelt”53 pages
- p. 5 …Imprint
N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the
Director of the Bureau of…
- p. 138 …1939-4I
N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national
defenses inadequate in the face…
- p. 141 …changed our requirements
for defensive aviation,” President Roosevelt strongly urged that $300,-
ooo,ooo be appropriated…
- p. 153 …When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re-
I 16
- p. 160 …T h e first step was made public on 3 September 1940 when President
Roosevelt revealed…
- p. 165 …These sentiments were expressed by President Roosevelt in a radio
address on 3 September: “This Nation…
- p. 169 …In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President
Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5…
- p. 170 …O n 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt requested the secretaries of
W a r and the…
- p. 171 …The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt,
an estimate of munitions requirements…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 174 …cent; other
nations, 10 per cent.'"
President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be…
- p. 185 …President Roosevelt’s request for the report had been
motivated wholly by considerations of logistics. But…
- p. 199 …On 5 July 1941
President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and…
- p. 220 …and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt
described in terms of the greatest danger faced…
- p. 258 …conflict between Japan and the
U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know…
- p. 273 …President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements
should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was…
- p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs
of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
- p. 287 …evening, the British
party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian
advisers a t…
- p. 297 …O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni-
tions, with a…
- p. 301 …In his address to
the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we
shall not…
- p. 302 …Ultimate decisions on major
military policies were taken by President Roosevelt, as Commander
in Chief of…
- p. 304 …Leahy as personal chief of staff to President
Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was…
- p. 322 …given to the nation by Presi-
dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e…
- p. 331 …At the end of January, President Roosevelt
advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to…
- p. 332 …During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by
President Roosevelt on 2…
- p. 352 …Secretary Stimson
reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from
even one carrier could…
- p. 366 …raised objections
which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the
more modest proposal of…
- p. 370 …Elliott Roosevelt during the
summer on an aerial survey of the east coast of Greenland in…
- p. 400 …Elliott Roosevelt and others failed
to locate a suitable site for an airdrome.120A satisfactory site…
- p. 409 …mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President
Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December…
- p. 465 …for effective
resistance in the Philippines, President Roosevelt had decided early in
February that the general…
- p. 480 …the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would
be a separate Southwest Pacific Area…
- p. 499 …Apparently
President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition,
although it is not possible…
- p. 553 …Lauchlin Currie had gone to
China as economic adviser to President Roosevelt for study of her…
- p. 630 …in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered
on 5 March, in which the Prime…
- p. 632 …plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on
8 April General Marshall and Harry…
- p. 633 …message of 1 7 April, in-
formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole…
- p. 635 …A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as…
- p. 640 …in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s
anxiety to get U.S. troops into…
- p. 641 …On 8 July the Prime
Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE-
HAMMER would probably…
- p. 642 …on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap-
parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver…
- p. 753 …This book shows the
close relations between Roosevelt and
the Committee T o Defend America by…
- p. 755 …Address by President Roosevelt at
Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and
War, pp. 767-72…
- p. 756 …Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18
Sept. 1941,in WP I-General.
I I I . Release of…
- p. 774 …Memo for Roosevelt from Stim-
son, 14 Mar. 1942.
163. lbid.
164. History, Sixth Air Force…
- p. 776 …Elliott Roosevelt,
zIst Recon. Sq. to TAG, 8 Sept. 1941;
memo for Col. Olds from Capt…
- p. 779 …Elliott
Roosevelt to TAG, 6 July 1941; Atlantic
Bridge, pp. 27-29.
117. Ltr., Sec. of…
- p. 780 …Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941
(Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt
to…
- p. 782 …Memo for S / W from President
Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321.
199. On the…
- p. 790 …Mills to TAG, Mac-
Arthur for Roosevelt, 11 Feb. 1942; msg.
#5, Australia to Marshall, 2…
- p. 802 …President Roosevelt had approved
the induction as early as 18 December
1941, contingent upon approval of…
- p. 857 …See also Coolidge;
Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson.
Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment…
- p. 858 …Erwin, 330, 339-41, 512
Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 3 18, 344
Roosevelt, Pres. F.D., 101…
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
for the first time General Brereton publicly stated the facts as he
recalled them, General MacArthur announced that he had received
no such recommendation and that prior to that publication he knew
“nothing of such a recommendation having been made.” ’This state-
ment lent special weight to the testimony of General Sutherland, who
during the preceding year had stated in an interview that the responsi-
bility for holding the bombers on the ground that morning was
entirely Breret0n’s.t It was Sutherland’s recollection that the air
commander agreed that there would be no point in attempting a
bomber mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an immediate reconnaissance mis-
sion was considered, but General Brereton, in reply to a request for
information on that point, has indicated that no authorization for
reconnaissance was received until later. “At the first conference,” he
wrote, “General Sutherland approved my plans for an attack imme-
diately after daylight, instructed me to go ahead with preparations and
that in the meantime, he would obtain General MacArthur’s authority
for the daylight attack.” 3 1
* T h e Brereton Diaries (New York, 1946); MacArthur’s statement of 2 7 Sept. 1946,
in N e w York Times, 28 Sept. 1946. In response to a request for information, General
Brereton several months earlier had given the Historical Office a statement of develo
ments on the first day of war that was substantially the same as that subsequentri
published. (1st ind., Brereton to Paul [ltr., Chief, AAF Historical Office to C G Third
Air Force, sub.: Air Defense of the Philippine Islands in December 1941,30 Jan. 19461.)
t The record of an interview by Walter D. Edmonds with Lt. Gen. Richard K.
Sutherland in Manila on 4 June 194s (copy supplied the author through the courtesy
of Mr. Edmonds) reads on the question of “Why was Formosa not bombed?” as
follows:
Gen. Sutherland began by saying that all the B-17s had been ordered to Del Monte
some days before. On a check it was found that only half had been sent. GHQ
wanted the planes in Del Monte because they would there have been safe from
initial Jap attacks-they could not have been reached at all-and they could them-
selves have staged out of Clark Field to bomb Formosa. This direct order had not
been obeyed. And it must be remembered that GHQ gave out general orders and
that the AFHq were supposed to execute them. As Sutherland recalls, there was
some plan to bomb Formosa, but Brereton said that he had to have Photos first.
That there was no sense in going up there to bomb without knowing what they
were going after. There were some 25 fields on Formosa. On December 9th and
roth, photo missions were dispatched-Carpenter going on the first and returning
with generator trouble; Connally going on the second but being turned back by
fighters. Holding the bombers at Clark Field that first day was entirely due t o
Brereton. (Italics mine, WDE.)
General Sutherland’s statement that all B-17’s had been ordered to Del Monte (sub-
sequently confirmed in MacArthur’s statement of September 1946) and General
Brereton’s account of the move have been discussed above in Chap. 5 , pp. 188-89.
On the immediate question of the employment of the planes at Clark Field on 8
December, the question of a prior order for their transfer is a side issue.
2 0 5