“Headquarters”60+ pages
- p. 5 …With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for
writing and publishing a seven…
- p. 8 …The first hectic months after Pearl
Harbor left little time in a military headquarters for consideration…
- p. 9 …Department calling for the appointment by AAF Headquarters of a
historian in accordance with the President…
- p. 10 …After returning
to Headquarters at the close of 1942, Colonel Williams found the
pressure of a…
- p. 11 …T h e first of those points, of course, was AAF
Headquarters itself. Though the Army…
- p. 12 …But, in developing a system
of historical reporting from other headquarters, the “supporting docu-
ments” received…
- p. 13 …in the hurried atmosphere of a military headquarters, and it depended
for its support upon men…
- p. 14 …In most cases, however, the offer of professional assistance from AAF
Headquarters was welcomed, though occasionally…
- p. 15 …close
of hostilities to bring into AAF Headquarters certain of the field per-
sonnel for the…
- p. 18 …Goss served as historian with the Fourth Air
Force and was subsequently brought into AAF Headquarters…
- p. 19 …Air Service Command,
USSTAF, was assigned to Headquarters, USSTAF.
Finally there remains something to be told…
- p. 21 …Simpson of the Office of
Air Force History, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Colonel
Paul has…
- p. 29 …JAPANESEINSTALLATIONS ON NORTHHEAD,KISKA,JULY1942
HEADQUARTERS,3 STH FIGHTERGROUP,PORT MORESBY,1942
HEADQUARTERS,3 gTH FIGHTERGROUP…
- p. 45 …and his
inspections took him to various headquarters, to depots and airfields,
to-and over-the…
- p. 53 …bulk of offensive air units to General Headquarters.
The War Department resisted in turn every proposal…
- p. 197 …The First Air Force, with headquarters at Mitchel Field, New
York, was acting as a major…
- p. 205 …The
approved peacetime garrisons called for one heavy bombardment
squadron and a group headquarters at Bermuda…
- p. 209 …P-36’s in crates, and the headquarters squadron
of the 28th Composite Group took up…
- p. 210 …Defense
Command, which forwarded the material to headquarters of the
Western Defense Command at San Francisco…
- p. 213 …Martin, was organized tactically
into the 18th Bombardment Wing, with headquarters at Hickam
Field, and the…
- p. 214 …provided the separate squadrons
with an air headquarters. Expansion of the Air Corps brought about
a…
- p. 221 …4th Composite Group, consisted of the
Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, the 3d Pursuit Squadron,
and the…
- p. 222 …AAF Headquarters felt that a striking force of
heavy bombers would be a necessary part of…
- p. 226 …during
a series of conferences at AAF Headquarters in Washington. On 16
November the military air…
- p. 230 …The watchers were
instructed to transmit their observations by telephone or telegraph to
headquarters of the…
- p. 232 …which prevailed over the preference of general
headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure…
- p. 252 …It would appear that the files of General Headquarters, Southwest
Pacific Area, are also i n…
- p. 254 …to General Headquarters, General
Brereton states that he returned to his own headquarters a t Nielson…
- p. 255 …George, chief of staff, V Interceptor Command, reported
to headquarters “that there are 54 airplanes in…
- p. 257 …The Summary of Activi-
ties for Headquarters, Far East Air Force, notes: “11:56 General
Brereton…
- p. 268 …At I I I 5 , inter-
ceptor headquarters received specific warning of enemy aircraft
approaching from…
- p. 270 …with a tele-
phone line to operations headquarters. Until the Del Monte base could
be greatly…
- p. 272 …O n another
occasion, 2 7th Group headquarters was falsely informed by telephone
that its A…
- p. 275 …two PBY’s to establish a new headquarters in Au~tralia.~’By +he
29th of December…
- p. 281 …mission.” lo*
General Brereton established a temporary headquarters at Darwin.
Though the aim of all operations…
- p. 288 …the air planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the…
- p. 308 …General Headquarters was of recent origin, but the desirability of
such a staff in the event…
- p. 310 …both unit and individual training.88 General Headquarters’
responsibility for air force training was limited to…
- p. 311 …WPD’s judgment that relations
between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in-
definite…
- p. 312 …Gates.lo7
General Headquarters was not consulted until 5 February, but Gen-
eral McNair had long…
- p. 315 …In reality the influence of AAF Headquarters on the actual conduct
of the war went far…
- p. 344 …The director of Air Defense at AAF
Headquarters concurred in every detail with the findings and…
- p. 346 …With its headquarters a t San Francisco, the command
included an extensive area of nine western…
- p. 378 …The headquarters was
established a t the main base a t Accra on 8 October 1941…
- p. 400 …Here, in January 1942, the headquarters
of the newly activated North Atlantic Sector of the Ferrying…
- p. 405 …into the bases.‘38
Army Air Forces Headquarters, the Ferrying Command, and other
interested AAF agencies…
- p. 425 …was to be maintained
between all major headquarters, logistical facilities would be shared,
and local commanders…
- p. 426 …O n 18 January, he located his headquarters at Lembang, ten miles north of
Bandoeng in…
- p. 434 …the United
States and it was the headquarters of USAFIA, whose responsibility in
January became chiefly…
- p. 435 …the 2 I st Air Flotilla and headquarters detach-
ments-moved to Davao during the first…
- p. 442 …officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash-
ington throughout January. Australian and Dutch forces were…
- p. 445 …organization, but co-ordination between its own
headquarters and the Dutch interceptor control remained imperfect.
T…
- p. 454 …In Java, General Wavell closed his personal headquarters on 2 5 Feb-
ruary, at which time…
- p. 462 …Final Efforts in the Philippines
When General Brereton’s headquarters had been moved to Austra-
lia…
- p. 482 …He proposed the establishment of
air headquarters in each defensive area, prepared to accept and operate…
- p. 486 …AAF Headquarters had been prompt to recognize the need
for properly equipped photographic squadrons, and shortly…
- p. 491 …In fact, A-3 of AAF Headquarters already had prepared a squadron,
the 68th, which was…
- p. 517 …Emmons, commanding the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, appealed to AAF Headquarters for additional planes, and these
were…
- p. 546 HEADQUARTERS, 3STH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
- p. 547 HEADQUARTERS, 35TH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
for the first time General Brereton publicly stated the facts as he
recalled them, General MacArthur announced that he had received
no such recommendation and that prior to that publication he knew
“nothing of such a recommendation having been made.” ’This state-
ment lent special weight to the testimony of General Sutherland, who
during the preceding year had stated in an interview that the responsi-
bility for holding the bombers on the ground that morning was
entirely Breret0n’s.t It was Sutherland’s recollection that the air
commander agreed that there would be no point in attempting a
bomber mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an immediate reconnaissance mis-
sion was considered, but General Brereton, in reply to a request for
information on that point, has indicated that no authorization for
reconnaissance was received until later. “At the first conference,” he
wrote, “General Sutherland approved my plans for an attack imme-
diately after daylight, instructed me to go ahead with preparations and
that in the meantime, he would obtain General MacArthur’s authority
for the daylight attack.” 3 1
* T h e Brereton Diaries (New York, 1946); MacArthur’s statement of 2 7 Sept. 1946,
in N e w York Times, 28 Sept. 1946. In response to a request for information, General
Brereton several months earlier had given the Historical Office a statement of develo
ments on the first day of war that was substantially the same as that subsequentri
published. (1st ind., Brereton to Paul [ltr., Chief, AAF Historical Office to C G Third
Air Force, sub.: Air Defense of the Philippine Islands in December 1941,30 Jan. 19461.)
t The record of an interview by Walter D. Edmonds with Lt. Gen. Richard K.
Sutherland in Manila on 4 June 194s (copy supplied the author through the courtesy
of Mr. Edmonds) reads on the question of “Why was Formosa not bombed?” as
follows:
Gen. Sutherland began by saying that all the B-17s had been ordered to Del Monte
some days before. On a check it was found that only half had been sent. GHQ
wanted the planes in Del Monte because they would there have been safe from
initial Jap attacks-they could not have been reached at all-and they could them-
selves have staged out of Clark Field to bomb Formosa. This direct order had not
been obeyed. And it must be remembered that GHQ gave out general orders and
that the AFHq were supposed to execute them. As Sutherland recalls, there was
some plan to bomb Formosa, but Brereton said that he had to have Photos first.
That there was no sense in going up there to bomb without knowing what they
were going after. There were some 25 fields on Formosa. On December 9th and
roth, photo missions were dispatched-Carpenter going on the first and returning
with generator trouble; Connally going on the second but being turned back by
fighters. Holding the bombers at Clark Field that first day was entirely due t o
Brereton. (Italics mine, WDE.)
General Sutherland’s statement that all B-17’s had been ordered to Del Monte (sub-
sequently confirmed in MacArthur’s statement of September 1946) and General
Brereton’s account of the move have been discussed above in Chap. 5 , pp. 188-89.
On the immediate question of the employment of the planes at Clark Field on 8
December, the question of a prior order for their transfer is a side issue.
2 0 5