The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
M. Brady, chief of staff to General Brereton, promptly took the initial
step toward mounting the operation by ordering the B-17’s at Clark
Field prepared for the mission.27Brereton himself reported at about
0500 to General MacArthur’s headquarters at Fort Santiago, where
he requested permission of Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, chief
of staff, to carry out offensive action as soon as possible after day-
light. s
That request, unhappily, has become a subject of controversy.
Conflicting statements have bee; made and the historian is left to find
his way without the aid of a complete record. Indeed, only a few
fragments of the official records of the Far East Air Force survived
the initial engagements and movements of the war, with the result
that chief reliance must be placed on the recollections of its personnel.
It would appear that the files of General Headquarters, Southwest
Pacific Area, are also i n ~ o m p l e t e . ~ ~
Since the question turns so largely on evidence drawn from the
memory that men carry of the first hectic hours of war, it seems
pertinent to observe here that there can be little doubt that to the
airmen of General MacArthur’s command the logical defensive use
of the long-range heavy bomber in the circumstances existing was to
strike at the enemy’s concentration of air and naval power on For-
mosa, and to strike before the enemy could attack.” Not only would
this have been in accord with standard AAF doctrine and with the
mission in defense of our own shores for which the B-17 originally
had been designed, but Formosa lay well within the range of the
plane, which incidentally had been built for missions extending be-
yond the distance for which fighter escort could be provided by cur-
rent models of pursuit aircraft. It is true that the number of planes
available was nowhere near that required for a decisive striking force,
but the defensive value of the B-17 lay almost entirely in its offensive
power and the alternative to its use in that manner was to save it for
possible destruction on the ground. Moreover, the mission presum-
ably would serve useful purposes of reconnaissance, and it would
have been in accordance with the recent revision of RAINBOW No.
s.* If General Brereton did not propose an early undertaking of
offensive action against the enemy on Formosa, as both officially and
publicly he has stated he did, it would be surprising indeed.
Following the publication in I 946 of The Brereton Diaries, in which
+ See above, pp. 184-85.
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