“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
T h e 3d Pursuit Squadron at Iba and the 17th a t Nichols each had
eighteen P-4oE’s; the 20th a t Clark was equipped with the same
number of P-qoB’s. T h e 2 1st and 34th Squadrons, respectively based
on the Nichols and Del Carmen fields, had arrived in the Philippines
only in late November and did not receive their planes until 7 De-
cember, when the former was assigned approximately eighteen hastily
assembled P-4oE’s and the latter took up its duties with P-35’s, each of
which had an average flying time close to 500 hours. Also available
were a miscellaneous assortment of noncombat aircraft and twelve
P-26’s flown from Batangas by pilots of the Philippine Air Force.’l
Had the Japanese been able to keep to their schedule, the attack on
the Philippines would have coincided much more closely than it did
with that at Pearl Harbor. But inclement weather above Luzon de-
layed execution of the plan for an early morning attack, and gave the
Americans advance notice of several hours.” In fact, the major attack
on Clark Field, where virtually half of our total bombing force was
destroyed on the ground, did not develop until after noon, some nine
hours following the initial bombing of Oahu.
In the Philippines, which lie on the other side of the international
date line, it was Monday, 8 December, when shortly after 0300 (0830
in Hawaii) a commercial radio station picked up a report of the Pearl
Harbor Though no official confirmation was immediately
available, base commanders received prompt notification and all units
were placed on combat alert. Within thirty minutes of this first warn-
ing, the radar set at Iba plotted a formation of aircraft about seventy-
five miles offshore headed toward Corregidor. T h e 3d Pursuit
Squadron immediately sent out planes for interception. As the radar
followed the course of the outgoing P-~o’s,it showed them making
contact with the approaching aircraft, after which the latter swung
off to the west and their plots disappeared. It was later learned that
our pursuits actually had made no interception. Apparently, the P-40’s
in the darkness had passed underneath the enemy planes.24 There
were no other alarms prior to receipt of official confirmation of the
outbreak of hostilities with Japan by 0500.
A plan of action which had been considered for this eventuality by
the Far East Air Force was an American air attack against Formosa,
the natural point of concentration for a Japanese invasion of the
phi lip pine^.'^ Objective folders, although without calibrated bomb tar-
get maps or aerial photographs, had been prepared,26 and Col. Francis
2 0 3