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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
Aero Repair Branch, and more than half of the depot property stocks
were destroyed. AAF casualties, especially at Hickam Field, were
heavy, reaching a total of 163 killed, 43 missing, and 336 wounded."
A tentative plan to strike at Midway on the return voyage was
abandoned by the Japanese because of the unfavorable weather. Ex-
cept for two carriers dispatched for participation in the attack on
Wake, the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the war indicated that they had at no time
contemplated a landing in Hawaii. N o r apparently was the capture
of Midway included in their original plans. T h e major Japanese drive,
as had been anticipated by the associated powers, would be directed
against the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, and in
its course would absorb the American-held Philippine Islands. That
drive would not be impeded by the fleet based at Pearl Harbor. T h e
enemy's victory had been perfect as few military operations are. Its
early consequences were to follow closely enough Japanese hopes.
Defeat on Luzon
According to the Japanese plan for the capture of the Philippine
Islands, naval air units would assume the initial responsibility for de-
struction of defending air and naval forces and for cover of the land-
ings. When beachheads had been established and Philippine airfields
had been captured, army air units would move in for the purpose of
supporting the ground forces. T h e first air assault was scheduled for
early morning on the same day of the attack in Hawaii."
Preparations had been well under way by the opening of November.
During the first two weeks of the month, land-based naval air units
of the I Ith Air Fleet were transferred to Formosa, where with ap-
proximately 300 planes they entered into intensive training in day and
night bombing, long-range reconnaissance, air coverage, and strafing
attack. As December came in, the Third Fleet was engaged in as-
sembling its main forces at Formosa for the amphibious invasion of
the Philippines; and to the naval air strength deployed at Formosan
bases were added 150 to 1 7 5 planes of the Fifth Army air force. T h e
main weight of army aviation was deployed in the south for support,
initially from Indo-Chinese bases, of the conquest of M a 1 a ~ a . l ~
For defense of the Philippines the Far East Air Force had in com-
mission thirty-three B - I ~ ' s ,of which sixteen were at Del Monte and
the rest at Clark Field, and approximately ninety pursuit aircraft."
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.