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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the American fleet, it was a t the same time necessary for the Japanese
to eliminate the danger of an effective reaction from the Hawaiian Air
Force. Accordingly, and simultaneously with the initial attack on the
fleet, twenty-eight bombers in three waves escorted by pursuits car-
ried out a ten-minute raid on buildings of the Hawaiian Air Depot
and the hangar line at Hickam Field. After a fifteen-minute lull, the
attack was renewed by five or six high-level bombers which fruit-
lessly bombed the baseball diamond; six to nine others dropped down
to 150 feet for a more damaging attack on the No. I Aqua System,
the technical buildings immediately behind the hangar lines, the con-
solidated barracks, and on planes parked almost wine tip to wing tip
on the warming-up apron. A third attack at approxlmately 0900 by
from six to nine planes scored hits on technical buildings, dispersed
planes, barracks, the parade ground, and the post exchange.’
At Wheeler Field, principal pursuit base, the first bombs fell shortly
after 0800. Approximately twenty-five dive bombers approzched the
field a t an altitude of about 5,000 feet, went into a dive, and released
their bombs over the hangar line. Within a few minutes the air seemed
full of planes circling in a counterclockwise direction but otherwise
maneuvering according to no apparent pattern. Though this attack
lasted for no more than fifteen minutes, other planes strafed the field
shortly after 0900. Bellows Field, third of the major Air Corps instal-
lations, suffered less than did either Hickam or Wheeler. Only one
plane out of the enemy’s first wave of attack, and that a fighter,
directed its attention to this field. But nine more fighters came over
soon after 0900 to give the field a thorough strafing for about fifteen
rnin~tes.~
In comparison with the havoc wrought by the planes that the Japa-
nese First Air Fleet threw against Hawaiian air and naval installations,
the reaction of defending air units was pitiful. The enemy had
achieved the crushing advantage of surprise. Moreover, under the
alert in effect since 27 November AAF planes were concentrated for
protection against sabotage, with an allowance of four hours’ notice
to make them ready for flight, instead of being dispersed in readiness
for a prompt take-off. In the circumstances, it was virtually impos-
sible to put up anything approaching an effective air defense. In spite
of handicaps, four P-40’s and two P-36’s took off from Wheeler Field
thirty-five minutes after the initial attack, and from 0830 until 0930
Army pursuit planes flew a total of twenty-five sorties. Perhaps the
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