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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
watch officer at the naval base and had begun a methodical search of
the restricted area. T h e six radar detector stations of the Hawaiian
Interceptor Command had been in operation since 0400; at 0700 they
reached the prescribed limit of their regular morning alert. O n this
occasion, however, the Opana station at Kahuku Point remained open
to provide additional instruction for one of the operators. At 0 7 0 2 the
station plotted a group of airplanes at approximately I 3 0 miles, bear-
ing 0” to 3 ” east of north. This fact was reported by telephone to
the information center about fifteen minutes later. Because of the
expected arrival of B - 1 7 ’ ~from the mainland and the probability of
search operations by US. naval aircraft, an Air Corps officer who
was on duty at this time “solely for training and observation” did not
consider it necessary to take any a ~ t i o n . ~Meanwhile the Opana sta-
tion had tracked the planes toward Oahu and had lost them. T w o
opportunities for an eleventh-hour reprieve had been forfeited.
At 0755 single-engine planes were observed southeast of the
Hickam Field hangar line heading for Pearl Harbor. Almost simul-
taneously the naval base and Hickam Field came under attack.
For approximately thirty minutes units of the Pacific Fleet were
subjected to the savage blows of wave after wave of enemy planes.
It is impossible to determine precisely the sequence of the enemy’s
actions; they included eight attacks delivered by some thirty dive
bombers, low-altitude attacks by more than twenty torpedo planes
sweeping across the harbor in four waves, and level bombing from
about 10,000 feet by perhaps fifteen aircraft. Then came a quarter-
hour of comparative quiet. At 0840 horizontal and dive bombers re-
newed the attack. This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow.
T h e battleship force had been most heavily hit. T h e Arizona, Cali-
fornia, and West Virginia had been sunk, the Oklahoma capsized, the
Nevada severely damaged, and three others damaged. Three cruisers,
three destroyers, and a seaplane tender had received damages of
varying degrees of severity; a mine layer and a target ship had been
sunk. Fortunately no carrier was in port. Naval and naval air installa-
tions had been seriously hurt. Of approximately 169 naval aircraft in
the Oahu area, 87 were destroyed. Tragically heavy too were losses
in Navy 2nd Marine Corps personnel, with 2,086 officers and men
killed or fatally wounded and an additional 749 wounded.‘
Although the primary purpose of the enemy had been to cripple
‘97

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