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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 430 …The Dutch had also constructed modern air- fields on Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and Amboina, and suitable…
  • p. 437 …The bombers returned that night to the Lhoknga emer- gency field in northern Sumatra, from which…
  • p. 438 …And so on the morning of 16 January, the day of Combs’ return from Sumatra, the…
  • p. 446 …The invasion of Sumatra began on 14 Feb- ruary with a paratroop drop at Palembang, where…
  • p. 452 …Possessed now of Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Celebes, Amboina, and Bali, the Japanese by the…
  • p. 783 …This shows that British forces were concentrated in Burma, Malaya, Sumatra, and Borneo. The Aus- tralians…
C H A P T E R 6
* * * * * * * * * * *
PEARL HARBOR AND
CLARK FIELD
1405 on 7 December the Japanese emissaries Nomura and
Kurusu arrived a t the State Department in Washington. By
orders from Tokyo they had originally arranged the appoint-
ment for I 300 but had subsequently requested the postponement.
Fifteen minutes later they presented to Secretary of State Cordell
Hull a memorandum which concluded with the regret that the Japa-
nese government considered it “impossible to reach an agreement
through further negotiations.” The hour’s delay in the meeting-
explained by the Japanese as having been consumed in decoding the
Tokyo message-rendered that conclusion a masterpiece of under-
statement. Half an hour earlier Japanese aircraft had attacked naval
and military installations in Oahu.
The attack achieved perfect tactical surprise: neither the exact
day nor the location of the initial Japanese blow had been correctly
estimated. But that Japan would strike soon and probably without a
previous declaration of war had for some time been appreciated
both in Washington and in the Pacific. After the diplomatic impasse
of 2 0 2 2 6 November, war had seemed inevitable; Mr. Hull had told
the President’s War Council that the matter of safeguarding our
national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.’ It was
this estimate of the situation which had caused the Army, and the
Navy, to send to commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines the
warning messages of 2 7 November described in the previous chapter.”
Because of the overwhelming success of the Japanese attacks of
7 December and of the handicap imposed thereby upon American
defense forces, the events of that day and of the preceding weeks
* See above, p. 190.
’94

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.