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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)
Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
- p. 303 …of Naval Opera-
tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen.
George…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 493 …Admiral King
believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who
were currently…
- p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi-
461
- p. 527 …t this stage of the
war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
- p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint
Chiefs a proposal that…
- p. 607 …type
* O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The
experience…
- p. 608 …s.’l A
formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
- p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab-
lishment of…
- p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position
on this point with the utmost clarity…
- p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy
Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
- p. 616 …viewed as a temporary
deta~hment.?~
Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
- p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer
to the antisubmarine…
- p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral
King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
- p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral
King had replied that, although he…
- p. 641 …54
A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and
a small staff flew to…
- p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King-
dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
- p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King-
dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
- p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King-
dom became the basis of action in January…
- p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King-
dom was the belief…
- p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King,
First Official Report to the Secretary of
the…
- p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S,
17 Mar. 1 % ~ .
34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
- p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942.
108. Zbid.
109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of
Midway, incl. in…
- p. 797 …306, 29 June
1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar-
shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
- p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung-
king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942;
memo for Gen. Arnold…
- p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942.
certain evidence from all Allied and
enemy sources…
- p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney,
26 May 1942.
7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
- p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept.
1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report;
memo for C G…
- p. 808 …to notes from Mar-
shall and Adm. King).
3 2 . A I c m o for…
- p. 814 …Forces to the United King-
dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942.
50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
- p. 851 …C.E., 48-50
Killin, Pfc, 219
Kilner Board, 1 2 0
Kimbolton, 63 I
King…
- p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also
King); controversy over air power vs.
battleship…
C H A P T E R 6
* * * * * * * * * * *
PEARL HARBOR AND
CLARK FIELD
1405 on 7 December the Japanese emissaries Nomura and
Kurusu arrived a t the State Department in Washington. By
orders from Tokyo they had originally arranged the appoint-
ment for I 300 but had subsequently requested the postponement.
Fifteen minutes later they presented to Secretary of State Cordell
Hull a memorandum which concluded with the regret that the Japa-
nese government considered it “impossible to reach an agreement
through further negotiations.” The hour’s delay in the meeting-
explained by the Japanese as having been consumed in decoding the
Tokyo message-rendered that conclusion a masterpiece of under-
statement. Half an hour earlier Japanese aircraft had attacked naval
and military installations in Oahu.
The attack achieved perfect tactical surprise: neither the exact
day nor the location of the initial Japanese blow had been correctly
estimated. But that Japan would strike soon and probably without a
previous declaration of war had for some time been appreciated
both in Washington and in the Pacific. After the diplomatic impasse
of 2 0 2 2 6 November, war had seemed inevitable; Mr. Hull had told
the President’s War Council that the matter of safeguarding our
national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.’ It was
this estimate of the situation which had caused the Army, and the
Navy, to send to commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines the
warning messages of 2 7 November described in the previous chapter.”
Because of the overwhelming success of the Japanese attacks of
7 December and of the handicap imposed thereby upon American
defense forces, the events of that day and of the preceding weeks
* See above, p. 190.
’94
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