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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
C H A P T E R 6
* * * * * * * * * * *
PEARL HARBOR AND
CLARK FIELD
1405 on 7 December the Japanese emissaries Nomura and
Kurusu arrived a t the State Department in Washington. By
orders from Tokyo they had originally arranged the appoint-
ment for I 300 but had subsequently requested the postponement.
Fifteen minutes later they presented to Secretary of State Cordell
Hull a memorandum which concluded with the regret that the Japa-
nese government considered it “impossible to reach an agreement
through further negotiations.” The hour’s delay in the meeting-
explained by the Japanese as having been consumed in decoding the
Tokyo message-rendered that conclusion a masterpiece of under-
statement. Half an hour earlier Japanese aircraft had attacked naval
and military installations in Oahu.
The attack achieved perfect tactical surprise: neither the exact
day nor the location of the initial Japanese blow had been correctly
estimated. But that Japan would strike soon and probably without a
previous declaration of war had for some time been appreciated
both in Washington and in the Pacific. After the diplomatic impasse
of 2 0 2 2 6 November, war had seemed inevitable; Mr. Hull had told
the President’s War Council that the matter of safeguarding our
national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.’ It was
this estimate of the situation which had caused the Army, and the
Navy, to send to commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines the
warning messages of 2 7 November described in the previous chapter.”
Because of the overwhelming success of the Japanese attacks of
7 December and of the handicap imposed thereby upon American
defense forces, the events of that day and of the preceding weeks
* See above, p. 190.
’94

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