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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Seattle”8 pages
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S fantry divisions were dispatched to positions around Lingayen Gulf and two more to positions along the Batangas coast. Long-standing differences between the Army and Navy over jurisdictional control of offshore patrol had brought some delay in effecting a desirable co- ordination of the reconnaissance activities of Patwing 10's PBY's and FEAF's B - 1 7 ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~but by I December, General MacArthur and Adm. Thomas C. Hart, having consulted with their air commanders, had reached an agreement for co-operative air patrols. Because of the greater speed and higher ceiling of the B-17, it was felt that the Army heavy bomber would be more suitable than the PBY for any engage- ments with Japanese fighters based on Formosa. The commanders therefore agreed that B- I 7's would patrol the northern area including Formosa, but the possibility of combat was lessened when General MacArthur ordered that the bombers keep a legal distance from the island. Southern waters were to be patrolled by Navy planes, which were authorized to carry out long-range missions as far as the Indo- China coast. These prewar patrol flights revealed large numbers of Japanese transport and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming the general assumption that some major move was afoot. Japanese aircraft were also noted in flight, but no American planes were at- tacked."' T h e Japanese themselves had undertaken reconnaissance flights over Luzon from Formosa during the last week of Ap- parently the Americans had no indication of this activity prior to 2 December, when a "hostile" aircraft was sighted over Clark Field at approximately 0530 hours. Pursuit pilots of the Far East Air Force, currently engaged in an intensified program of training in problems of interception and gunnery, received orders to intercept any such plane thereafter. During each of the next three nights a plane was detected, but attempts at interception failed. O n the fifth morning, antiaircrait batteries maintained an alert while pursuit forces remained on the ground. T h e radar set at Iba tracked several aircraft, but no plane appeared over Clark Field."' By that date, 6 December, General MacArthur had established a final alert. All stations were manned and the number of guards increased, special precautions had been taken against subversive activities, and all aircraft were dispersed as best they could be, each under guard."' T h e program of Philippine air reinforcement, which had rapidly gained momentum during October and November, was far from com- 191
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