“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
fantry divisions were dispatched to positions around Lingayen Gulf
and two more to positions along the Batangas coast. Long-standing
differences between the Army and Navy over jurisdictional control of
offshore patrol had brought some delay in effecting a desirable co-
ordination of the reconnaissance activities of Patwing 10's PBY's and
FEAF's B - 1 7 ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~but by I December, General MacArthur and
Adm. Thomas C. Hart, having consulted with their air commanders,
had reached an agreement for co-operative air patrols. Because of the
greater speed and higher ceiling of the B-17, it was felt that the Army
heavy bomber would be more suitable than the PBY for any engage-
ments with Japanese fighters based on Formosa. The commanders
therefore agreed that B- I 7's would patrol the northern area including
Formosa, but the possibility of combat was lessened when General
MacArthur ordered that the bombers keep a legal distance from the
island. Southern waters were to be patrolled by Navy planes, which
were authorized to carry out long-range missions as far as the Indo-
China coast. These prewar patrol flights revealed large numbers of
Japanese transport and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move was afoot. Japanese
aircraft were also noted in flight, but no American planes were at-
tacked."'
T h e Japanese themselves had undertaken reconnaissance flights
over Luzon from Formosa during the last week of Ap-
parently the Americans had no indication of this activity prior to 2
December, when a "hostile" aircraft was sighted over Clark Field at
approximately 0530 hours. Pursuit pilots of the Far East Air Force,
currently engaged in an intensified program of training in problems
of interception and gunnery, received orders to intercept any such
plane thereafter. During each of the next three nights a plane was
detected, but attempts at interception failed. O n the fifth morning,
antiaircrait batteries maintained an alert while pursuit forces remained
on the ground. T h e radar set at Iba tracked several aircraft, but no
plane appeared over Clark Field."' By that date, 6 December, General
MacArthur had established a final alert. All stations were manned and
the number of guards increased, special precautions had been taken
against subversive activities, and all aircraft were dispersed as best
they could be, each under guard."'
T h e program of Philippine air reinforcement, which had rapidly
gained momentum during October and November, was far from com-
191