“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
era1 Brereton notified officials of the Royal Australian Air Force at
Port Moresby to expect the arrival of the B-zq’s, while General Short
in Hawaii was given details of the mission by the War Department.
For a while it appeared that American forces in the Pacific would
soon have firsthand information and phorographs of Japanese naval
concentrations, but the B - q 7 S were delayed in departing from the
United States. Within a few days the War Department expressed fear
that the mission was impracticable because of the distance to be flown.
T h e mission was not canceled, however, and one of the B-24’s on 5
December reached Hawaii, where it was decided to hold it until “satis-
factorily armed.” From the first there had been difficulty in securing
and equipping the planes for the mission, and at the outbreak of hostili-
ties the second plane had not yet left the United States.Io3
In the meantime, American commanders in the Pacific had received
definite warning of an impending break in Japanese-American rela-
tions. T h e War Department on 2 7 November sent a message, regarded
as a “final alert,” l o 4to Army commanding officers in the Philippines,
Hawaii, Panama, and the Western Defense Command, which included
Alaska, warning them:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided
the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil pop-
ulation or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you
will carry out the tasks assigned in RAINBOW 5 so far as they pertain to
Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum es-
sential 0fficers.1~~
The message to General MacArthur did not include reference to
alarm of the civil population.loB
Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines immediately con-
ferred with U.S. High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre. On 28 No-
vember, General MacArthur reported that everything was being put
in readiness for a successful defense, measures having been taken,
among other things, to extend and intensify reconnaissance patrols.
Within twenty-four hours thereafter, Army forces in the Philippines
were placed upon war alert, all leaves were canceled, and two in-
‘90