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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 40 …On recommendation of an American mission sent to Europe in June under newly commissioned Col. Raynal…
  • p. 50 …a r I1 and its self- conceived mission can be appreciated only in light of a…
  • p. 52 …In the lower grades, where promotion was controlled inexorably by seniority, Air Service pilots found themselves…
  • p. 56 …complete control of the Army and form an integral part thereof.” Yet the Crowell mission, appointed…
  • p. 60 …The Lampert Committee went far beyond its designated mission, bringing under review the whole province of…
  • p. 63 …to it a more or less independent mission. Experi- ence in World War I seemed to…
  • p. 65 …Command respon- sibility for that mission within the Air Corps devolved upon the Com- manding General…
  • p. 66 …Navy in further- awe of their respective missions. The Air Corps Tactical School claimed for air…
  • p. 69 …which fights for and gains control of the air,’’ and to calculate a well-balanced air…
  • p. 71 …Mitchell could still believe that “it was an established fact that the principal mission of an…
  • p. 80 …based on the fundamental doctrine that their mission is to aid the ground forces to gain…
  • p. 81 …The mission of the Army was defense of the United States and its outlying territories, but…
  • p. 129 …assigned to the air force an independent mission of strategic bombing. Accordingly, in March 1918 the…
  • p. 155 …By taking control of French or English colonial possessions, victorious Axis powers might lodge themselves at…
  • p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the US. Army and Navy…
  • p. 235 …Long-standing differences between the Army and Navy over jurisdictional control of offshore patrol had brought…
  • p. 241 …And because the chain of command in both Pacific areas and in Washington vested ultimate control…
  • p. 270 …Other combat activity by pursuit piiots was incidental to scheduled reconnaissance missions, as when on I…
  • p. 273 …Atlantic and India,” would come under his control at Bangal~re.’~ It soon became evident, however…
  • p. 295 …American forces in Burma, and later in India, had as a primary mission the promotion of…
  • p. 306 …The mission of the MAB was to keep current estimates of U.S.-British munitions resources…
  • p. 308 …of a “nucleus of GHQ.” Its original mission was to direct the training of the tactical…
  • p. 314 …The field forces remained under the control of the General Staff, and the War Plans Division…
  • p. 316 …General Arnold’s control of the US. Air Force is as com- plete, virtually, as is…
  • p. 317 …it also made possible a certain indirect control from Washington through letters written more often in…
  • p. 343 …To permit effective control of fighter planes at night or during bad weather would have required…
  • p. 368 …constituted as of 29 May.’l The mission of the new command was, first, “to move…
  • p. 379 …A North African military mission under Brig. Gen. Russell H. Maxwell had been established at Cairo…
  • p. 397 …In helping to prepare HALPRO for overseas movement by air and in controlling the flight along…
  • p. 412 …to perform a series of remarkable special missions. Shuttling between Australia, the Philippines, the Nether- lands…
  • p. 426 …formation of task forces to undertake specific missions, and for their command he was to designate…
  • p. 441 …But of these, four missions involving a total of seventeen bombers were abortive because of un…
  • p. 458 …During January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi- mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a…
  • p. 464 …attempting a take-off for yet another mission of relief.’ If the Americans on Bataan and…
  • p. 472 …naval control, during which time six of the planes flew the first American bomber mission against…
  • p. 475 …Such missions, however, could be flown only with the greatest expenditure of time and effort. Until…
  • p. 500 …remain in the Far East under the control of General S t i l ~ e l…
  • p. 503 …But circumstances beyond the control of the aircrews were against the flight. Although a fortuitous and…
  • p. 525 …of Midway, nor had it retained operational control of the few planes actually sent up to…
  • p. 527 …If the vulnerable PBY's were shot down while executing their search mission, this was a…
  • p. 549 …those who had flown their first combat mission in April had to fight a feeling of…
  • p. 571 …largest mission to date comprised a total of six bombers- would remain under theater control but…
  • p. 589 …This, the Army felt, might lead ultimately to Navy control of all air forces. As late…
  • p. 620 …At the same time, it initiated projects peculiar to its own mission and by the end…
  • p. 621 …It would work in conjunction with naval forces and under their operational control “wherever this may…
  • p. 646 …the British Joint Staff Mission a t Washington, the American Military Mission at London.” The American…
  • p. 647 …General Chaney opened his headquarters in the American Embassy building on 19 May 1941.'' His mission…
  • p. 648 …Air forces would have two missions: to pro- vide, in certain areas, an “air defense, integrated…
  • p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking…
  • p. 651 …Military Mission in London-under direct control of the commanding general of U S . Field Forces…
  • p. 654 …They consider that function their primary mission here and are not willing to surrender it.1le…
  • p. 659 …bombardment missions, either by direct coverage or by synchronized fighter sweeps. Strategic control of AAF operations…
  • p. 669 …o n ~ . ~ ’ ~Such operations under the RAF control system required numerous modifications for the plane-about…
  • p. 683 …not be adequate to carry out the mission intended for it under GYM- NAST. H e…
  • p. 684 …T o adapt the Eighth Air Force to its new mission required a con- siderable reshuffling…
  • p. 717 …develop- ment of adequate machinery for the control of combat operations by establishing the Provisional I…
  • p. 728 …2 , 27 AUGUST 2942 HE Eighth Air Force flew its first mission in an atmosphere charged…
  • p. 730 …in preparation for initial operations under RAF control. Each of the three squadrons was attached for…
  • p. 731 …Policy concerning the pro- vision and control of fighter escort had not yet been determined, but…
  • p. 735 …Shortly before 1900 hours, watchers on the control tower spotted a cluster of specks to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
era1 Brereton notified officials of the Royal Australian Air Force at
Port Moresby to expect the arrival of the B-zq’s, while General Short
in Hawaii was given details of the mission by the War Department.
For a while it appeared that American forces in the Pacific would
soon have firsthand information and phorographs of Japanese naval
concentrations, but the B - q 7 S were delayed in departing from the
United States. Within a few days the War Department expressed fear
that the mission was impracticable because of the distance to be flown.
T h e mission was not canceled, however, and one of the B-24’s on 5
December reached Hawaii, where it was decided to hold it until “satis-
factorily armed.” From the first there had been difficulty in securing
and equipping the planes for the mission, and at the outbreak of hostili-
ties the second plane had not yet left the United States.Io3
In the meantime, American commanders in the Pacific had received
definite warning of an impending break in Japanese-American rela-
tions. T h e War Department on 2 7 November sent a message, regarded
as a “final alert,” l o 4to Army commanding officers in the Philippines,
Hawaii, Panama, and the Western Defense Command, which included
Alaska, warning them:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided
the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil pop-
ulation or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you
will carry out the tasks assigned in RAINBOW 5 so far as they pertain to
Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum es-
sential 0fficers.1~~
The message to General MacArthur did not include reference to
alarm of the civil population.loB
Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines immediately con-
ferred with U.S. High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre. On 28 No-
vember, General MacArthur reported that everything was being put
in readiness for a successful defense, measures having been taken,
among other things, to extend and intensify reconnaissance patrols.
Within twenty-four hours thereafter, Army forces in the Philippines
were placed upon war alert, all leaves were canceled, and two in-
‘90

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