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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 era1 Brereton notified officials of the Royal Australian Air Force at Port Moresby to expect the arrival of the B-zq’s, while General Short in Hawaii was given details of the mission by the War Department. For a while it appeared that American forces in the Pacific would soon have firsthand information and phorographs of Japanese naval concentrations, but the B - q 7 S were delayed in departing from the United States. Within a few days the War Department expressed fear that the mission was impracticable because of the distance to be flown. T h e mission was not canceled, however, and one of the B-24’s on 5 December reached Hawaii, where it was decided to hold it until “satis- factorily armed.” From the first there had been difficulty in securing and equipping the planes for the mission, and at the outbreak of hostili- ties the second plane had not yet left the United States.Io3 In the meantime, American commanders in the Pacific had received definite warning of an impending break in Japanese-American rela- tions. T h e War Department on 2 7 November sent a message, regarded as a “final alert,” l o 4to Army commanding officers in the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and the Western Defense Command, which included Alaska, warning them: Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil pop- ulation or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in RAINBOW 5 so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum es- sential 0fficers.1~~ The message to General MacArthur did not include reference to alarm of the civil population.loB Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines immediately con- ferred with U.S. High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre. On 28 No- vember, General MacArthur reported that everything was being put in readiness for a successful defense, measures having been taken, among other things, to extend and intensify reconnaissance patrols. Within twenty-four hours thereafter, Army forces in the Philippines were placed upon war alert, all leaves were canceled, and two in- ‘90
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