“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ground forces for defense of Mindanao, but the natural advantages of
a soil that lent itself to rapid development of all-weather strips pro-
vided an argument which prevailed over the preference of general
headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure loca-
tion. Accordingly, authority was granted to establish a temporary base
at Del Monte, where one runway suitable for heavy bombers had
existed for some months, pending a “definite location of the Bomber
Command” in the Visayan islands.99In another hurried decision the
5th Air Base Group, which had arrived in Luzon on 2 0 November,
was selected to develop the new base under the direction of Maj. Ray
T. Elsmore. Within one week, boats were procured, equipment and
supplies were loaded, and the 5oo-mile voyage from Manila was com-
pleted by the air base group. Native labor and local commercial com-
panies assisted in rushing completion of minimum facilities, but no
more than the bare minimum had been provided when the first B - 1 7 ’ ~
moved down from Clark on 5 December. Only one radio capable of
communication between Mindanao and Luzon had been set up, and
maintenance facilities were practically nonexistent.lo0
The incompleteness of these preparations at Del Monte governed
the decision on movement of the heavy bombers from Clark Field. On
4 December, General Brereton directed that immediate steps be taken
to move two squadrons with their sixteen B - I ~ ’ s ,plus a limited number
of B - 1 8 ’ ~for use as air transport, to Del Monte under a plan to have
the bombers stage through Clark Field for operations in the event of
hostilities. Though he shared the common concern over the vulner-
ability of the bombers at Clark Field, this initial movement was limited
to two squadrons because of the anticipated early arrival of the 7th
Bombardment Group ( H ) and a plan to base that entire group on
Del Monte.” Its ground echelon was already en route between Hawaii
* According to published accounts (see Frazier Hunt, MacArthur and the W a r
Against Japan [New York, 19441, pp. 30-31; Herbert Asbury and Frank Gervasi,
“MacArthur-The Story of a Great American Soldier,” Colliers, t I July 1945, and
its condensation in the Reader’s Digest for January 1946) since confirmed by General
MacArthur (see statement of 27 September 1946, N e w York Times, 2 8 September
1946), General Brereton was ordered prior to 8 December 1941 to move all B-17’s to
Del Monte. In response to a question on this point by the AAF Historical Office,
General Brereton indicated that the initiative for the transfer came from his own staff
and stated that “approval for the movement of the 16 Flying Fortresses to Del Monte
was obtained from General Sutherland only with the understanding that they would
be returned to airfields to be constructed on Cebu and Luzon as soon as the necessary
operating facilities could be prepared.” (See 1st ind., Brereton to Paul [Itr., Chief,
AAF Historical Office to CG, Third Air Force, sub.: Air Defense of the Philippine
Islands in December 1941, 3 0 Jan. 19461.) General Brereton’s recollection fits so
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