“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ground forces for defense of Mindanao, but the natural advantages of
a soil that lent itself to rapid development of all-weather strips pro-
vided an argument which prevailed over the preference of general
headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure loca-
tion. Accordingly, authority was granted to establish a temporary base
at Del Monte, where one runway suitable for heavy bombers had
existed for some months, pending a “definite location of the Bomber
Command” in the Visayan islands.99In another hurried decision the
5th Air Base Group, which had arrived in Luzon on 2 0 November,
was selected to develop the new base under the direction of Maj. Ray
T. Elsmore. Within one week, boats were procured, equipment and
supplies were loaded, and the 5oo-mile voyage from Manila was com-
pleted by the air base group. Native labor and local commercial com-
panies assisted in rushing completion of minimum facilities, but no
more than the bare minimum had been provided when the first B - 1 7 ’ ~
moved down from Clark on 5 December. Only one radio capable of
communication between Mindanao and Luzon had been set up, and
maintenance facilities were practically nonexistent.lo0
The incompleteness of these preparations at Del Monte governed
the decision on movement of the heavy bombers from Clark Field. On
4 December, General Brereton directed that immediate steps be taken
to move two squadrons with their sixteen B - I ~ ’ s ,plus a limited number
of B - 1 8 ’ ~for use as air transport, to Del Monte under a plan to have
the bombers stage through Clark Field for operations in the event of
hostilities. Though he shared the common concern over the vulner-
ability of the bombers at Clark Field, this initial movement was limited
to two squadrons because of the anticipated early arrival of the 7th
Bombardment Group ( H ) and a plan to base that entire group on
Del Monte.” Its ground echelon was already en route between Hawaii
* According to published accounts (see Frazier Hunt, MacArthur and the W a r
Against Japan [New York, 19441, pp. 30-31; Herbert Asbury and Frank Gervasi,
“MacArthur-The Story of a Great American Soldier,” Colliers, t I July 1945, and
its condensation in the Reader’s Digest for January 1946) since confirmed by General
MacArthur (see statement of 27 September 1946, N e w York Times, 2 8 September
1946), General Brereton was ordered prior to 8 December 1941 to move all B-17’s to
Del Monte. In response to a question on this point by the AAF Historical Office,
General Brereton indicated that the initiative for the transfer came from his own staff
and stated that “approval for the movement of the 16 Flying Fortresses to Del Monte
was obtained from General Sutherland only with the understanding that they would
be returned to airfields to be constructed on Cebu and Luzon as soon as the necessary
operating facilities could be prepared.” (See 1st ind., Brereton to Paul [Itr., Chief,
AAF Historical Office to CG, Third Air Force, sub.: Air Defense of the Philippine
Islands in December 1941, 3 0 Jan. 19461.) General Brereton’s recollection fits so
I 88