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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 ground forces for defense of Mindanao, but the natural advantages of a soil that lent itself to rapid development of all-weather strips pro- vided an argument which prevailed over the preference of general headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure loca- tion. Accordingly, authority was granted to establish a temporary base at Del Monte, where one runway suitable for heavy bombers had existed for some months, pending a “definite location of the Bomber Command” in the Visayan islands.99In another hurried decision the 5th Air Base Group, which had arrived in Luzon on 2 0 November, was selected to develop the new base under the direction of Maj. Ray T. Elsmore. Within one week, boats were procured, equipment and supplies were loaded, and the 5oo-mile voyage from Manila was com- pleted by the air base group. Native labor and local commercial com- panies assisted in rushing completion of minimum facilities, but no more than the bare minimum had been provided when the first B - 1 7 ’ ~ moved down from Clark on 5 December. Only one radio capable of communication between Mindanao and Luzon had been set up, and maintenance facilities were practically nonexistent.lo0 The incompleteness of these preparations at Del Monte governed the decision on movement of the heavy bombers from Clark Field. On 4 December, General Brereton directed that immediate steps be taken to move two squadrons with their sixteen B - I ~ ’ s ,plus a limited number of B - 1 8 ’ ~for use as air transport, to Del Monte under a plan to have the bombers stage through Clark Field for operations in the event of hostilities. Though he shared the common concern over the vulner- ability of the bombers at Clark Field, this initial movement was limited to two squadrons because of the anticipated early arrival of the 7th Bombardment Group ( H ) and a plan to base that entire group on Del Monte.” Its ground echelon was already en route between Hawaii * According to published accounts (see Frazier Hunt, MacArthur and the W a r Against Japan [New York, 19441, pp. 30-31; Herbert Asbury and Frank Gervasi, “MacArthur-The Story of a Great American Soldier,” Colliers, t I July 1945, and its condensation in the Reader’s Digest for January 1946) since confirmed by General MacArthur (see statement of 27 September 1946, N e w York Times, 2 8 September 1946), General Brereton was ordered prior to 8 December 1941 to move all B-17’s to Del Monte. In response to a question on this point by the AAF Historical Office, General Brereton indicated that the initiative for the transfer came from his own staff and stated that “approval for the movement of the 16 Flying Fortresses to Del Monte was obtained from General Sutherland only with the understanding that they would be returned to airfields to be constructed on Cebu and Luzon as soon as the necessary operating facilities could be prepared.” (See 1st ind., Brereton to Paul [Itr., Chief, AAF Historical Office to CG, Third Air Force, sub.: Air Defense of the Philippine Islands in December 1941, 3 0 Jan. 19461.) General Brereton’s recollection fits so I 88
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