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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S battalion for transfer to the Far East Air Force; but the action came too late to be of assistance in defense of the phi lip pine^.'^ A lack of antiaircraft artillery defenses made it appear all the more unlikely that any hostile air attacks could be halted before military and civil installations had been seriously damaged. Most of the three-inch guns were clustered around Manila harbor, while a limited store of additional three-inch and 37-mm. guns were stored in the Philippine Ordnance Depot. Except for Clark Field, where the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) was stationed, all airfields and other vital points were virtually without antiaircraft protection. Early in November Maj. Gen. J.A. Green, Chief of Coast Artillery, had suggested that part of the harbor defense regiment be reassigned to antiaircraft defense of airfields and other similarly critical areas, and plans for a greatly ex- panded air force had required attention to problems of defense in the Visayas and Mindanao. Prior to the war, however, little progress had been made, and both General Brereton and General Green were much concerned over the safety of grounded aircraft in the event of an early outbreak of hostilities. Even the Manila area was inadequately pro- tected. For three-inch shells, only low-altitude powder-train fuzes were available, and there were few automatic weapon^.'^ In view of the relatively weak air defenses, the importance of dispersal areas for heavy bombers became paramount. Yet the number of fields suitable for the purpose was far below the number needed. An airfield construction program, which included the extension and improvement of existing fields as well as the preparation of new ones, had been adjusted to the expanding requirements of the air force, but it progressed much too slowly to meet with the satisfaction of air commanders. Only Clark Field, with two large hangars, a limited dis- persal area, blast pens, and barracks, could be considered reasonably complete; and its vulnerability was a major cause of concern to Gen- eral Brereton and his staff. In mid-November attempts were made by air force officials to acquire construction equipment for building dispersal pens at Clark, but the efforts came to naught.” Of chief significance in the development of a building program was the decision to establish a heavy bomber base on Mindanao, southern- most of the large islands in the Philippines. This decision was in accordance with recommendations made by General Brereton’s staff during his absence in mid-November on a trip to Australia. Objections were raised because the war plan for the Philippines did not provide ‘87
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