“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
battalion for transfer to the Far East Air Force; but the action came
too late to be of assistance in defense of the phi lip pine^.'^
A lack of antiaircraft artillery defenses made it appear all the more
unlikely that any hostile air attacks could be halted before military and
civil installations had been seriously damaged. Most of the three-inch
guns were clustered around Manila harbor, while a limited store of
additional three-inch and 37-mm. guns were stored in the Philippine
Ordnance Depot. Except for Clark Field, where the 200th Coast
Artillery (AA) was stationed, all airfields and other vital points were
virtually without antiaircraft protection. Early in November Maj.
Gen. J.A. Green, Chief of Coast Artillery, had suggested that part of
the harbor defense regiment be reassigned to antiaircraft defense of
airfields and other similarly critical areas, and plans for a greatly ex-
panded air force had required attention to problems of defense in the
Visayas and Mindanao. Prior to the war, however, little progress had
been made, and both General Brereton and General Green were much
concerned over the safety of grounded aircraft in the event of an early
outbreak of hostilities. Even the Manila area was inadequately pro-
tected. For three-inch shells, only low-altitude powder-train fuzes
were available, and there were few automatic weapon^.'^
In view of the relatively weak air defenses, the importance of
dispersal areas for heavy bombers became paramount. Yet the number
of fields suitable for the purpose was far below the number needed.
An airfield construction program, which included the extension and
improvement of existing fields as well as the preparation of new ones,
had been adjusted to the expanding requirements of the air force, but
it progressed much too slowly to meet with the satisfaction of air
commanders. Only Clark Field, with two large hangars, a limited dis-
persal area, blast pens, and barracks, could be considered reasonably
complete; and its vulnerability was a major cause of concern to Gen-
eral Brereton and his staff. In mid-November attempts were made by
air force officials to acquire construction equipment for building
dispersal pens at Clark, but the efforts came to naught.”
Of chief significance in the development of a building program was
the decision to establish a heavy bomber base on Mindanao, southern-
most of the large islands in the Philippines. This decision was in
accordance with recommendations made by General Brereton’s staff
during his absence in mid-November on a trip to Australia. Objections
were raised because the war plan for the Philippines did not provide
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