The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
battalion for transfer to the Far East Air Force; but the action came
too late to be of assistance in defense of the phi lip pine^.'^
A lack of antiaircraft artillery defenses made it appear all the more
unlikely that any hostile air attacks could be halted before military and
civil installations had been seriously damaged. Most of the three-inch
guns were clustered around Manila harbor, while a limited store of
additional three-inch and 37-mm. guns were stored in the Philippine
Ordnance Depot. Except for Clark Field, where the 200th Coast
Artillery (AA) was stationed, all airfields and other vital points were
virtually without antiaircraft protection. Early in November Maj.
Gen. J.A. Green, Chief of Coast Artillery, had suggested that part of
the harbor defense regiment be reassigned to antiaircraft defense of
airfields and other similarly critical areas, and plans for a greatly ex-
panded air force had required attention to problems of defense in the
Visayas and Mindanao. Prior to the war, however, little progress had
been made, and both General Brereton and General Green were much
concerned over the safety of grounded aircraft in the event of an early
outbreak of hostilities. Even the Manila area was inadequately pro-
tected. For three-inch shells, only low-altitude powder-train fuzes
were available, and there were few automatic weapon^.'^
In view of the relatively weak air defenses, the importance of
dispersal areas for heavy bombers became paramount. Yet the number
of fields suitable for the purpose was far below the number needed.
An airfield construction program, which included the extension and
improvement of existing fields as well as the preparation of new ones,
had been adjusted to the expanding requirements of the air force, but
it progressed much too slowly to meet with the satisfaction of air
commanders. Only Clark Field, with two large hangars, a limited dis-
persal area, blast pens, and barracks, could be considered reasonably
complete; and its vulnerability was a major cause of concern to Gen-
eral Brereton and his staff. In mid-November attempts were made by
air force officials to acquire construction equipment for building
dispersal pens at Clark, but the efforts came to naught.”
Of chief significance in the development of a building program was
the decision to establish a heavy bomber base on Mindanao, southern-
most of the large islands in the Philippines. This decision was in
accordance with recommendations made by General Brereton’s staff
during his absence in mid-November on a trip to Australia. Objections
were raised because the war plan for the Philippines did not provide
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