“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R 1 1
ron prepared at all times for reconnaissance and bombing missions,
while the 24th Pursuit Group was to keep a three-plane flight from
each squadron on the alert from daybreak until dark. These orders
were in effect by 10
Five days later, all pursuit aircraft were placed on constant alert,
fully armed, and with pilots on thirty-minute call. Except for the 34th
Squadron, at Del Carmen Field, all pursuit squadrons were completely
equipped with P-40’s by the end of November. The 17th and 2 1 s
Squadrons at Nichols Field and the 3d at Iba had P-~oE’s,but the 20th
at Clark Field still had obsolescent P-4oB’s. In addition to the Ameri-
can units, the 6th Squadron of the Philippine army was equipped with
outmoded P-26’s and was based at Batangas. T w o other fields, Nielson
and Rosales, were available for pursuit operations, while O’Donnell,
San Fernando, and Ternate fields were under construction. All the
airfields were located on Luzon, radiating out from the focal points of
Manila and the island fortress of Corregidor a t the entrance to Manila
Bay.@5
Despite the modern equipment of most of the pursuit squadrons and
their apparent readiness for action, the total system of air defense in
the Philippines had not reached a satisfactory stage. Both the aircraft
warning service and the antiaircraft defenses were sadly inadequate,
although new items of equipment were en route from the United
States. Without sufficient warning of a hostile air attack, the pursuit
forces would be unable to take to the air in time to intercept the
enemy; yet the status of the aircraft warning system pointed to just
such an eventuality. In the absence of radar equipment, General Mac-
Arthur had established a rudimentary system which depended mainly
upon native air watchers posted a t strategic points. The watchers were
instructed to transmit their observations by telephone or telegraph to
headquarters of the V Interceptor Command at Nielson Field; from
this point the information would be relayed by teletype to a plotting
board a t Clark Field. Although seven radar sets had reached the Philip-
pines by the first week in December, only two-one a t Iba and an-
other outside Manila-were in operation a t the time of the Japanese
attack. Officials in the Philippines as well as at AAF Headquarters
were greatly concerned over the absence of trained aircraft warning
units and the lack of highly developed radar equipment which would
reveal the altitude and course of approaching aircraft. Remedial action
was begun in November with organization of an aircraft warning
I 86