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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R 1 1 ron prepared at all times for reconnaissance and bombing missions, while the 24th Pursuit Group was to keep a three-plane flight from each squadron on the alert from daybreak until dark. These orders were in effect by 10 Five days later, all pursuit aircraft were placed on constant alert, fully armed, and with pilots on thirty-minute call. Except for the 34th Squadron, at Del Carmen Field, all pursuit squadrons were completely equipped with P-40’s by the end of November. The 17th and 2 1 s Squadrons at Nichols Field and the 3d at Iba had P-~oE’s,but the 20th at Clark Field still had obsolescent P-4oB’s. In addition to the Ameri- can units, the 6th Squadron of the Philippine army was equipped with outmoded P-26’s and was based at Batangas. T w o other fields, Nielson and Rosales, were available for pursuit operations, while O’Donnell, San Fernando, and Ternate fields were under construction. All the airfields were located on Luzon, radiating out from the focal points of Manila and the island fortress of Corregidor a t the entrance to Manila Bay.@5 Despite the modern equipment of most of the pursuit squadrons and their apparent readiness for action, the total system of air defense in the Philippines had not reached a satisfactory stage. Both the aircraft warning service and the antiaircraft defenses were sadly inadequate, although new items of equipment were en route from the United States. Without sufficient warning of a hostile air attack, the pursuit forces would be unable to take to the air in time to intercept the enemy; yet the status of the aircraft warning system pointed to just such an eventuality. In the absence of radar equipment, General Mac- Arthur had established a rudimentary system which depended mainly upon native air watchers posted a t strategic points. The watchers were instructed to transmit their observations by telephone or telegraph to headquarters of the V Interceptor Command at Nielson Field; from this point the information would be relayed by teletype to a plotting board a t Clark Field. Although seven radar sets had reached the Philip- pines by the first week in December, only two-one a t Iba and an- other outside Manila-were in operation a t the time of the Japanese attack. Officials in the Philippines as well as at AAF Headquarters were greatly concerned over the absence of trained aircraft warning units and the lack of highly developed radar equipment which would reveal the altitude and course of approaching aircraft. Remedial action was begun in November with organization of an aircraft warning I 86
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