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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

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“United Press”36 pages

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
tion of associated forces in the Far East had been supplanted by
provisions for mutual co-operation.”
With modification of the basic war plan pointing up the importance
of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash-
ington undertook to accelerate the dispatch of heavy bombers to the
Philippines. By the second week in November it was planned to send
“all modernized” B-I 7’s from the United States to the Far East; within
a few days the plan was broadened to include all B-24’s as well. Fulfil-
ment of the project would have left only seventeen B-17’s within the
Zone of the Interior: five B - I ~ E ’ swhich were being used for test
flights, one B - I ~ Cwhich was in a repair depot, and eleven B - I ~ A ’ s
and B’s which were obsolete. So serious was the situation in the Far
East that even the twelve B-17’s of the Hawaiian Air Force were
under consideration for transfer to the Philippines. T h e priority which
the Far East Air Force now occupied not only disrupted the training
activities of the Hawaiian Air Force, but it also relegated the air de-
fense needs of Hawaii to a secondary place. By z z November, AAF
officials warned that all available heavy bombers and pursuit planes
destined for the Philippines should be en route not later than 6 De-
cember. This hope was not fulfilled, but it reflected a growing fear
that the planned reinforcements would not reach the Philippines in
time to insure the defense of the islands. T h e program of reinforce-
ment had been based on an assumption that hostilities could be post-
poned until a t least March or April 1942. Japanese movements in the
Pacific now seemed to presage a much earlier outbreak of hostilities, as
also did the strained diploniatic relations between the United States
and Japan.92
T h e Far East Air Force had begun to take precautionary measures
early in General Brereton ordered all post, group, and
squadron commanders to be prepared for any emergency. Each head-
quarters was to operate a message center continuously and was to
designate an “alert officer” in addition to the officer of the day. Base
commanders were ordered to keep sufficient personnel available to
perform guard duties and any other tasks required in an emergency.
Special instructions to tactical units emphasized the need for opera-
tional readiness: not only were aircraft to be dispersed so as to mini-
mize the effects of an aerial attack, but crews for all aircraft in
commission were to be placed on “two-hour readiness” call day and
night. T h e 19th Bombardment Group was ordered to have one squad-
‘85

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