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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Hamilton”9 pages
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S tion of associated forces in the Far East had been supplanted by provisions for mutual co-operation.” With modification of the basic war plan pointing up the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash- ington undertook to accelerate the dispatch of heavy bombers to the Philippines. By the second week in November it was planned to send “all modernized” B-I 7’s from the United States to the Far East; within a few days the plan was broadened to include all B-24’s as well. Fulfil- ment of the project would have left only seventeen B-17’s within the Zone of the Interior: five B - I ~ E ’ swhich were being used for test flights, one B - I ~ Cwhich was in a repair depot, and eleven B - I ~ A ’ s and B’s which were obsolete. So serious was the situation in the Far East that even the twelve B-17’s of the Hawaiian Air Force were under consideration for transfer to the Philippines. T h e priority which the Far East Air Force now occupied not only disrupted the training activities of the Hawaiian Air Force, but it also relegated the air de- fense needs of Hawaii to a secondary place. By z z November, AAF officials warned that all available heavy bombers and pursuit planes destined for the Philippines should be en route not later than 6 De- cember. This hope was not fulfilled, but it reflected a growing fear that the planned reinforcements would not reach the Philippines in time to insure the defense of the islands. T h e program of reinforce- ment had been based on an assumption that hostilities could be post- poned until a t least March or April 1942. Japanese movements in the Pacific now seemed to presage a much earlier outbreak of hostilities, as also did the strained diploniatic relations between the United States and Japan.92 T h e Far East Air Force had begun to take precautionary measures early in General Brereton ordered all post, group, and squadron commanders to be prepared for any emergency. Each head- quarters was to operate a message center continuously and was to designate an “alert officer” in addition to the officer of the day. Base commanders were ordered to keep sufficient personnel available to perform guard duties and any other tasks required in an emergency. Special instructions to tactical units emphasized the need for opera- tional readiness: not only were aircraft to be dispersed so as to mini- mize the effects of an aerial attack, but crews for all aircraft in commission were to be placed on “two-hour readiness” call day and night. T h e 19th Bombardment Group was ordered to have one squad- ‘85
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