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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ment had granted permission for General MacArthur’s representatives
to establish not only air ferrying routes, but also training bases, mainte-
nance facilities, munitions storage, and communications in Australian
territory. In mid-November, General Brereton left Manila on an
inspection tour which included Darwin, Townsville, Port Moresby,
Lae, and Rabaul. At Melbourne, in conference with the chief of the
Australian air staff, General Brereton initiated negotiations for im-
provement of Australian airfields and the development of maintenance
facilities in accordance with the special needs of American planes.89
There was also a growing co-operation of American commanders
with representatives of still other nations in the area. The British air
chief at Singapore had gone to Manila at least twice to confer with
General MacArthur. From the Governor General of the Netherlands
East Indies, General MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences
with Netherlands officials who visited Manila. Both British and Neth-
erlands representatives had approved the American requests within
the scope of their authority. Naval officials of the two governments
had held conversations with the commander in chief of the US. Asiatic
Fleet, while within American commands some co-ordination was
achieved between the Far East Air Force and the Navy’s Patrol Wing
Ten (Patwing I O ) , comprising thirty PBY’s based in the phi lip pine^.^'
In the United States, Army and Navy officials with the co-operation
of British representatives were working out an agreement for the co-
ordination of operations in the event of war in the Far East. By 2 1
November a growing tension in relations with Japan and the prospec-
tive growth of military aviation in the Philippines had resulted in a
revision of the basic war plan RAINBOW No. 5. The plan had pre-
viously visualized only defensive operations by Army forces and the
Asiatic Fleet. Augmentation of the Army air garrison in the Philip-
pines had now modified that concept so that the revised plan provided
for offensive air operations in furtherance of the strategic defensive,
along with operations in direct defense of the Philippine Islands as
an air and naval base. In the event of hostilities, the defending air
forces were to carry out “air raids against Japanese forces and installa-
tions within tactical operating radius of available bases.” General
MacArthur, who was given broad powers to develop the modified
plan in conjunction with local British authorities, was at the same time
notified that earlier plans for “British strategic direction” in joint ac-
‘84

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.