“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ment had granted permission for General MacArthur’s representatives
to establish not only air ferrying routes, but also training bases, mainte-
nance facilities, munitions storage, and communications in Australian
territory. In mid-November, General Brereton left Manila on an
inspection tour which included Darwin, Townsville, Port Moresby,
Lae, and Rabaul. At Melbourne, in conference with the chief of the
Australian air staff, General Brereton initiated negotiations for im-
provement of Australian airfields and the development of maintenance
facilities in accordance with the special needs of American planes.89
There was also a growing co-operation of American commanders
with representatives of still other nations in the area. The British air
chief at Singapore had gone to Manila at least twice to confer with
General MacArthur. From the Governor General of the Netherlands
East Indies, General MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences
with Netherlands officials who visited Manila. Both British and Neth-
erlands representatives had approved the American requests within
the scope of their authority. Naval officials of the two governments
had held conversations with the commander in chief of the US. Asiatic
Fleet, while within American commands some co-ordination was
achieved between the Far East Air Force and the Navy’s Patrol Wing
Ten (Patwing I O ) , comprising thirty PBY’s based in the phi lip pine^.^'
In the United States, Army and Navy officials with the co-operation
of British representatives were working out an agreement for the co-
ordination of operations in the event of war in the Far East. By 2 1
November a growing tension in relations with Japan and the prospec-
tive growth of military aviation in the Philippines had resulted in a
revision of the basic war plan RAINBOW No. 5. The plan had pre-
viously visualized only defensive operations by Army forces and the
Asiatic Fleet. Augmentation of the Army air garrison in the Philip-
pines had now modified that concept so that the revised plan provided
for offensive air operations in furtherance of the strategic defensive,
along with operations in direct defense of the Philippine Islands as
an air and naval base. In the event of hostilities, the defending air
forces were to carry out “air raids against Japanese forces and installa-
tions within tactical operating radius of available bases.” General
MacArthur, who was given broad powers to develop the modified
plan in conjunction with local British authorities, was at the same time
notified that earlier plans for “British strategic direction” in joint ac-
‘84