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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S their own planes, staked them down for the night, and then retired for a few hours’ rest, with many of the men sleeping under the wings of the aircraft. At 0445 the next morning the planes took off for Wake Island, 1,035 miles away, where they arrived at 1 1 2 0 . Since the next hop to Port Moresby involved flying over some of the Japanese mandated islands, the planes took off at midnight in order to pass over the territory unseen and thereby avoid any possible inter- national incident. Climbing from their usual altitude of 8,000 feet to 26,000 feet, the bombers turned out all lights and maintained complete radio silence over the islands. Although they flew in a heavy rain and without communications, the B- I 7’s kept their assigned positions, and the 2,176-mile hop to Port Moresby was completed at noon on 8 September (local time j . Australian officials were most hospitable to the crews, who remained at Port Moresby until the morning of 10 September. The next hop, 934 miles to Darwin, was covered in six and one-half hours, and early on the morning of I Z September the planes took off for Clark Field, near Manila. Upon encountering stormy weather, the B- I 7’s maneuvered into storm echelon, flying over water a t an altitude of from IOO to 400 feet. By mid-afternoon the bombers reached Clark Field, where they landed safely in a blinding rain.*l Successful completion of the historic flight, ’despite primitive servicing facilities and incomplete weather data, offered reassuring proof that the Philippines could be reinforced by air. General MacArthur, who regarded the air defense of the islands as one of the more serious deficiencies to be remedied, urged prompt action to provide additional aircraft and the equipment for an ade- quate aircraft warning service. A program of airfield development was already under way, and funds had been provided for a more extensive program. Particularly welcome therefore was the news that his com- mand was scheduled to receive before the end of November a light bombardment group equipped with fifty-two A-24’s and a heavy bombardment group with twenty-six B- I 7’s. These forces were the practical expression of a policy which, despite the many urgent de- mands on the AAF’s limited resources, gave to the Philippines the highest priority in the delivery of needed combat forces. Indeed, out of an anticipated production in the United States of z 20 heavy bombers by the end of February 1942, no less than 165 of the planes had been scheduled for delivery to the Philippines.82 Inasmuch as the aerial route via Midway and Wake was endangered 179
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