Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
hold the islands against enemy assault. Army air units, organized into
the Far East Air Force under Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, had a
total of some 8,000 officers and men and more than 300 aircraft, con-
centrated largely on the island of Luzon. Fewer than half of these
aircraft were suitable for combat, and much of the equipment for air
defense was still awaiting shipment from the United States.73But the
air force was equipped with thirty-five heavy bombers, more than
any other Army air force, either on the continent or overseas. This
fact was significant, for the Philippines had not always enjoyed top
priority among American outposts. Indeed, for many years the Air
Corps garrison there had been regarded as little more than a token
force and had not been considered capable of meeting “serious con-
tingencies.” 7 4 As late as the spring of 1940, military aviation in the
islands consisted of a mere handful of obsolete planes such as the P-26
and B-10, and during the summer of 1940 only three B-18’s were
allotted to the Philippines. No additional aircraft could be spared at
that time from units in the United States, and prospects of an early
augmentation of pursuit strength were dimmed by a statement from
the Air Corps that the twenty-eight P-26’s then assigned to the Philip-
pine Department would have to suffice until late in 1 9 4 1 . ~ ~Between
the time of this statement and the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific,
however, War Department policy with regard to the Philippines
underwent a drastic change, and the rapid expansion of aerial defenses
in the islands represented one of the more important results of that
change.
The possibility of American involvement in a Pacific war had been
heightened in the fall of 1940by formation of a pact between the Axis
powers and Japan. Agreeing to support each other’s efforts in estab-
lishing and maintaining “a new order of things” in Europe and East
Asia, the parties announced that they would assist one another “with
all political, economic, and military means when one of the three con-
tracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the
European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.’’ ‘I6 T h e reference of
course was obvious, and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt
described in terms of the greatest danger faced by the nation since
settlement of the c~ntinent.‘~
As part of a prompt attempt to strengthen the defenses of our most
western outpost insofar as it was possible, the Chief of the Air Corps
in October directed that forty-eight P-~s’s,scheduled for shipment to
176

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.