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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S be stationed on the islands.68 T h e Navy was rapidly improving air- fields at both locations, but service and maintenance facilities and housing were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, on 2 8 November notified the W a r Department that two pursuit squadrons, each consisting of approximately I 2 0 officers and men and 25 P-~o’s,were ready for dispatch by carrier to Wake and Midway. T h e islands were to be reinforced also by Marine air- craft within a few days. When it was pointed out that the P-40’s would be frozen to the islands because of their inability to land on carriers, the Navy advised that final decision as to shipment of the planes should be held in abeyan~e.~’ By this time, military and naval commanders in Hawaii had received warning of an impending break in American and Japanese relations, and forces in the islands had been placed on an alert. T h e standard operating procedure of the Hawaiian Department outlined three alerts: the first required defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands; the second called for security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and air forces, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage; and the third provided for occupation of all field positions by all units, in preparation for the maximum defense of Oahu and Army installations on outlying islands in the Territory of Hawaii.’” Because a local estimate of the situation indicated that sabotage was more likely than outright attack by hostile forces, the Hawaiian Department ordered Alert No. I into operation and notified the W a r Department of its actions. Aircraft were concentrated in hangars or in open spaces near by, and extra guards were placed about the aircraft and military installations. Construction was started on protective fencing and floodlighting project^.'^ Of the imminence of hostilities, there was little doubt; but it was generally felt that the most likely area of attack was in the phi lip pine^.'^ T h e eve of hostili- ties therefore found the Hawaiian Air Force continuing, as it had throughout the fall of 1941, to aid in rushing aerial reinforcements to the Philippines. The Philippine lslmnds American forces in the Philippine Islands were not ready for war by December 1941, but they were well aware of the threat of war and preparations were going forward in accordance with a plan to I 7 5
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