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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Hamilton”9 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 “the air situation in Hawaii.” The result was formation of a detailed plan for the employment of bombardment aviation in the islands. The plan, drawn up by the Hawaiian Air Force, regarded the two existing pursuit groups as adequate so long as they were maintained at full combat strength. Projected radar installations-six detector stations were in operation by December 1941-were also considered to be reasonably sufficient. The heart of the plan lay in three major pro- visions: a complete and thorough air reconnaissance of the Hawaiian area during daylight; an attack force available on call to hit any target located as a result of the search; and, if the objective should be an aircraft carrier, attack against the target on the day before it could maneuver into position to launch its planes for an assault on Oahu. An early morning carrier attack was regarded as the most likely line of action to be taken by an enemy. The proposed plan for air defense pointed out that if the Hawaiian Air Force were to assume responsi- bility for its own reconnaissance, seventy-two B- I 7’s would be required to search daily the area within the circle of an 833-nautical- mile radius from Oahu, each plane covering a 5 ” sector. Since the required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than were then in use in the entire AAF, the plan obviously could not be put into operation. But the position of the Hawaiian Air Force had been made a matter of record; an aggressive defense, provided by long-range striking planes, was felt to be “the best and only means” of locating and attacking enemy carriers before they could come within launching distance of Oahu.6‘ The ability of the Hawaiian Air Force to perform its mission was affected in the fall of 1941 by a decision of the War Department to send reinforcements to the Philippines and by calls from the Navy Department for assistance in the defense of outlying islands in the Hawaiian area. The former gave the Hawaiian Air Force a lower priority in allocation of aircraft and required a diversion of some of its strength. The naval requests for assistance proved to be only a threat of diversion, but the total effect of these actions was to draw attention away from the immediate defense of Oahu. The Navy, which was charged with defense of certain outlying islands, found that because of a shortage of aircraft it would not be able to provide air forces for protection of Midway and Wake islands. Late in Octo- ber a Navy request for Army air garrisons met with the reply that essential installations must first be provided before any aircraft could 174
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