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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Command, provided for a group of advanced bases, a series of inter-
mediate airfields, a chain of fields between Anchorage and the United
States, and an extensive aircraft warning system. The first item pro-
voked the greatest amount of discussion among the services respon-
sible for protection of Alaska. The older theory of Alaskan defense
had been centered around the Seward-Anchorage areas, supplemented
by joint Army and Navy defense of naval installations at Kodiak
Island; and control of the North Pacific was naturally regarded as a
task of the Navy, operating from bases at Kodiak and Dutch Harbor.
The latter base, on Unalaska Island in the Aleutians, constituted the
westernmost installation in the area. Protection of Dutch Harbor was
a function of Army air units, and since that protection could not be
furnished without air bases in the vicinity, the Alaska Defense Com-
mand proposed to construct: a field on Umnak Island, sixty-five miles
west of Dutch Harbor. Naval authorities viewed the proposal as
undesirable, for Umnak had no adequate harbor development and
construction of the base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping was at a premium."
There was, however, a cogent reason for development of an airfield
on Umnak, beyond considerations of immediate protection of Dutch
Harbor. Such a base would increase the striking range of Army
bombers, enabling them to command a radius 400 miles greater than
would be possible from such a point as Chignik, on the Alaska Penin-
sula. It was important that any hostile force be intercepted before it
could launch an attack, and it was likewise important that enemy
forces be prevented from establishing bases in the outer Aleutians.
For both contingencies, the existence of an airfield and a long-range
striking force in the Aleutians seemed to be necessary. The Aleutian
Islands comprised steppingstones which could lead in two directions,
and their offensive possibilities for American forces would be nqllified
by a lack of airfields, At the insistence of the Navy Department the
Umnak proposal was referred to the Joint Board of the Army and
Navy, and approval was given on 26 November 1 9 4 1 . ~ ~
The remainder of the air defense program met with little opposi-
tion. Airfield construction was proceeding under the direction of
Army engineers and the Civil Aeronautics Administration, although
in the colder areas of Alaska the work was impeded by arctic condi-
tions. Heavy rainfall, particularly along the southern and western
* See maps, pp. 305, 463.
I 68

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