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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
air forces, depended upon a complicated chain of command. In order
to communicate with officials in Washington it was necessary for the
air force to direct its correspondence through the Alaska Defense
Command, which forwarded the material to headquarters of the
Western Defense Command at San Francisco; only from this point
could the correspondence be sent directly to the W a r Department.
The close attention given to Alaskan air needs by both the Alaska
and the Western Defense Commands, however, tended to compensate
for any delays encountered in the routing of requests.
T h e decision to station military air units in Alaska had not been
made until after the outbreak of war in Europe, although the Air
Corps for some years had advocated such a move. Once the threat to
American security became clear, there was general agreement as to
the necessity for systematic air defense of Alaska. But determination
of the position which military aviation would occupy in the total
system of Alaskan defense required a considerable amount of discus-
sion among the services, and several basic issues were not settled until
the eve of hostilities. Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., heading the
Alaska Defense Command, sought approval of a program of strategi-
cally located airfields and adequate garrisons for the bases. It was
estimated that any enemy assault on the territory would be primarily
an air attack, which could be opposed only by air forces previously
stationed in the area. In joint plans of the Army and Navy, however,
Alaskan defense was essentially a function of the Navy, supported
by air and ground forces at those points where coastal installations
required protection from air raids. Little attention was originally
given to the potentialities of long-range striking forces in opposing
an enemy assault, although the Air Corps was convinced of the im-
portance of all phases of military aviation in Alaskan defense. Because
of the nature of the terrain and the lack of transportation facilities,
ground forces were virtually tied to their stations, and local Army
commanders felt that only strong air forces and a system of well-
developed airfields could assure the mobility needed to repulse a co.
ordinated enemy T h e practicability of air operations in
Alaska had been demonstrated by both military and commercial air-
craft, and a new AAF cold-weather experimental station at Ladd
Field, Fairbanks, was preparing to conduct tests which would reveal
better methods of equipping aircraft for arctic operations.
T h e plan for air defense, as worked out by the Alaska Defense
167

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.