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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

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“United Press”36 pages

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
per cent of all search operations in the area. Total compliance would
have completely disrupted the striking force which the bomber com-
mand was obligated to maintain in order to attack enemy naval craft
or installations within its radius of action. Both naval and military
forces were operating below their authorized strength, and regardless
of desires for mutual assistance and plans to that end, the Caribbean
area was sadly deficient in the matter of aerial overwater reconnais-
sance.
T h e vital importance of this phase of canal defense was revealed
in an estimate of enemy capabilities prepared by the Caribbean De-
fense Command in the latter part of November 1941.Japan was
regarded in respect to the canal itself as the primary potential enemy,
and a carrier-based attack from the Pacific was considered “not an
improbable feat.” Other possibilities were taken into account, but it
was concluded that in any event the most important defensive meas-
ure was “increasing and thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing forces
in the area were regarded as sufficient to repel any probable initial
attack on the canal provided they were given timely warning of the
approach of hostile forces. T h e inability of defending naval and mili-
tary air forces to perform the required amount of reconnaissance and
to provide the “timely warning” constituted perhaps the chief weak-
ness in Caribbean defense immediately prior to American entry into
the war. It was a weakness which was recognized by both Army and
Navy commanders; their expressed hope lay in the postponement of
attack by an enemy until the defending forces could achieve the
proper degree of co-ordination and the necessary equipment for
complete coverage of the vast sea frontiers.
T h e emergence of the air weapon as the predominant element of
Caribbean defense was not unnatural in the light of the European
war and the geography of the area. T h e experience of Great Britain
and other countries at the hands of the Luftwaffe had affected the
growth of American air power in general and the strengthening of
overseas garrisons in particular. T h e climax of prewar air preparations
in the Caribbean occurred in September with the elevation of General
Andrews from his post as head of the air force to that of the Carib-
bean Defense Command, marking the first time an airman had ever
commanded all Army forces in the area. T h e Caribbean Air Force,
now under the command of Maj. Gen. Davenport Johnson, was not
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