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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“The Invaders”15 pages
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S per cent of all search operations in the area. Total compliance would have completely disrupted the striking force which the bomber com- mand was obligated to maintain in order to attack enemy naval craft or installations within its radius of action. Both naval and military forces were operating below their authorized strength, and regardless of desires for mutual assistance and plans to that end, the Caribbean area was sadly deficient in the matter of aerial overwater reconnais- sance. T h e vital importance of this phase of canal defense was revealed in an estimate of enemy capabilities prepared by the Caribbean De- fense Command in the latter part of November 1941.Japan was regarded in respect to the canal itself as the primary potential enemy, and a carrier-based attack from the Pacific was considered “not an improbable feat.” Other possibilities were taken into account, but it was concluded that in any event the most important defensive meas- ure was “increasing and thorough reconnaissance and observation of the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing forces in the area were regarded as sufficient to repel any probable initial attack on the canal provided they were given timely warning of the approach of hostile forces. T h e inability of defending naval and mili- tary air forces to perform the required amount of reconnaissance and to provide the “timely warning” constituted perhaps the chief weak- ness in Caribbean defense immediately prior to American entry into the war. It was a weakness which was recognized by both Army and Navy commanders; their expressed hope lay in the postponement of attack by an enemy until the defending forces could achieve the proper degree of co-ordination and the necessary equipment for complete coverage of the vast sea frontiers. T h e emergence of the air weapon as the predominant element of Caribbean defense was not unnatural in the light of the European war and the geography of the area. T h e experience of Great Britain and other countries at the hands of the Luftwaffe had affected the growth of American air power in general and the strengthening of overseas garrisons in particular. T h e climax of prewar air preparations in the Caribbean occurred in September with the elevation of General Andrews from his post as head of the air force to that of the Carib- bean Defense Command, marking the first time an airman had ever commanded all Army forces in the area. T h e Caribbean Air Force, now under the command of Maj. Gen. Davenport Johnson, was not 1 6 5
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