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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 47 …s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division (strategic reserve), and Italian and Portuguese…
  • p. 113 …Japanese Air Power The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms, had…
  • p. 119 …naval air service, and a colonial air force.” For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost…
  • p. 120 …In its first “combat” test during the thirties the Italian Air Force faced no real opposition…
  • p. 121 …The hope was not fulfilled, for numerous weaknesses in the Italian Air Force rapidly came to…
  • p. 122 …The fundamental weakness of the Italian Air Force was not in its theory of air power…
  • p. 197 …naval forces, and within prescribed boundaries to destroy any German and Italian naval, air, and ground…
  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 554 …Chennault, who since 1937 had been serving as special adviser to the Chinese Air Force. Known…
  • p. 705 …Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, to England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was…
  • p. 752 …USSBS, Japanese Air Power. 9. Notes on the Italian Air Force, in special file of Brig…
  • p. 805 …History, First Air Force. 44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8 May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p…
  • p. 851 …E S Italian Air Force: 82-85; development, Italian East Africa, 84 Italy, Air Ministry, 82…
  • p. 857 …See Italian Air Force. Reinforcements. See theaters. Renault works, 593 Replacement Control Depot, ~ z t h…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
under one command in order that the full weight of available air
power could readily be thrown against an enemy at whatever point
he might appear.
Operational planning in the Caribbean took on a new note of real-
ism during the months just prior to American entry into the war.
Joint plans for armed assistance to certain South and Central Amer-
ican republics, in the event of attack by a non-American state or by
“fifth columnists,” provided for action by Caribbean defense forces
and also troops in the United States. Essential features of the plan
called for the occupation on forty-eight hours’ notice of strategic
interior points by Caribbean-based troops transported by air, the
prompt occupation of seaports by naval forces, and the reinforcement
of these forces by Army expeditionary troops dispatched from the
United States. It was clear that the security of the Panama Canal
would be menaced by the successful overthrow of recognized govern-
ments in countries near the canal and the establishment of regimes
opposed to the principles of Pan American solidarity. Although there
was no occasion to invoke these plans, their existence gave the Carib-
bean Air Force a high priority in the delivery of transport planes from
the United States and enabled Caribbean defense forces to experiment
with airborne operations in the fall of 1941. Following activation of
an infantry airborne battalion at Howard Field and arrival of a para-
chute battalion from the United States, co-operative exercises were
carried out by ground and air forces in the Canal Zone, and subse-
quent reassignment of the airborne units from the Panama Canal
Department to the Caribbean Air Force for training purposes made
possible a higher degree of co-ordination. Of the overseas departments
of the Army, the Caribbean Defense Command was unique in the
possession of airborne forces on the eve of hostilities.
Local planning for armed assistance to Latin-American republics
served to emphasize the need for closer Army-Navy co-ordination
in the Caribbean. A considerable body of evidence indicated that
voluntary co-operation” would not insure effective joint defense,
but the insistence of the Caribbean Defense commander upon unity
of command was to no avail prior to American entry into the war.
The subject of joint action came to the fore in mid-1941 when an
increasing number of reports of Axis vessels in Caribbean waters led
the local Navy commandant to request assistance from the Caribbean
Air Force. By September the air force had been asked to assume 50
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.