“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
air bases of long standing, while a third permanent base, Howard
Field, was nearing completion three miles from Albrooli. Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and a number of emergency landing fields
which did not require extensive improvements. By the first week of
December 1941 a total of 183 planes, as opposed to an authorized
strength of 396, were assigned to bases in the Canal Zone. A t Albrook
Field were I 14 aircraft of all types, including 7 I P-~o’s,while France
Field had 49 planes, most of them obsolete, and Howard Field had
t o aircraft, including 1 2 A-ZOA’S.Such outmoded types as the P-26
and the A-17 made up a large part of the strength; their value in pro-
tecting the canal was negligible.4o Of eight B- I 7’s, which comprised
the heavy bombardment force of the entire Caribbean area, four had
been sent to Trinidad and four were in Panama b y November, but
the growing crisis in the Far East resulted in a move to concentrate
the planes in the Canal Zone b y December. Tactical units defending
the canal included the 6th and 9th Bombardment Groups ( H ) , the
59th Bombardment Squadron (L), the 16th, 32d, and 37th Pursuit
Groups, the 7th and 44th Reconnaissance Squadrons, and the 39th
Observation Squadron. Three air base groups, an air depot, and signal
and ordnance units performed the necessary service functions in the
Canal Zone.41
Steps toward co-ordination of defense efforts in the Caribbean area
had been taken early in 1940. Joint Army and Navy war plans, recog-
nizing the possibility of enemy action in the region, had defined the
bounds of a Caribbean theater, and Army plans provided for designa-
tion of the commanding general of the Panama Canal Department as
commanding general of the theater. In the spring of 1941 the plans
were put into action with formation of the Caribbean Defense Com-
mand; organization of a single air force as a part of the command was
a natural Concomitant to the action. T h e defense command was
divided into Panama, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad sectors, the com-
manders of which were responsible for defense of the respective areas
and for training of all assigned personnel except those of the Carib-
bean Air Force. T h e air force, organized on a theater-wide basis and
subdivided into bomber, interceptor, and service commands, was
charged with planning, training, and execution of plans for air opera-
tions and defense against air attack throughout the Caribbean. T h e
basic principle of its organization was the concentration of force
I 6 3