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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
air bases of long standing, while a third permanent base, Howard
Field, was nearing completion three miles from Albrooli. Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and a number of emergency landing fields
which did not require extensive improvements. By the first week of
December 1941 a total of 183 planes, as opposed to an authorized
strength of 396, were assigned to bases in the Canal Zone. A t Albrook
Field were I 14 aircraft of all types, including 7 I P-~o’s,while France
Field had 49 planes, most of them obsolete, and Howard Field had
t o aircraft, including 1 2 A-ZOA’S.Such outmoded types as the P-26
and the A-17 made up a large part of the strength; their value in pro-
tecting the canal was negligible.4o Of eight B- I 7’s, which comprised
the heavy bombardment force of the entire Caribbean area, four had
been sent to Trinidad and four were in Panama b y November, but
the growing crisis in the Far East resulted in a move to concentrate
the planes in the Canal Zone b y December. Tactical units defending
the canal included the 6th and 9th Bombardment Groups ( H ) , the
59th Bombardment Squadron (L), the 16th, 32d, and 37th Pursuit
Groups, the 7th and 44th Reconnaissance Squadrons, and the 39th
Observation Squadron. Three air base groups, an air depot, and signal
and ordnance units performed the necessary service functions in the
Canal Zone.41
Steps toward co-ordination of defense efforts in the Caribbean area
had been taken early in 1940. Joint Army and Navy war plans, recog-
nizing the possibility of enemy action in the region, had defined the
bounds of a Caribbean theater, and Army plans provided for designa-
tion of the commanding general of the Panama Canal Department as
commanding general of the theater. In the spring of 1941 the plans
were put into action with formation of the Caribbean Defense Com-
mand; organization of a single air force as a part of the command was
a natural Concomitant to the action. T h e defense command was
divided into Panama, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad sectors, the com-
manders of which were responsible for defense of the respective areas
and for training of all assigned personnel except those of the Carib-
bean Air Force. T h e air force, organized on a theater-wide basis and
subdivided into bomber, interceptor, and service commands, was
charged with planning, training, and execution of plans for air opera-
tions and defense against air attack throughout the Caribbean. T h e
basic principle of its organization was the concentration of force
I 6 3

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.