“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
direct the operation of antiaircraft artillery, aircraft warning services,
passive defense measures, and interceptor aviation. The last element
was conspicuous by its absence throughout most of 1941, but the
plan for unified air defense was keeping pace with developments in
the Zone of the Interior. The aircraft strength of the 13th Wing by
the end of April 1941, consisting of only three A-17’s and twenty-
one B-I~A’s,was not sufficient to meet either defense or training
needs of the 27th Reconnaissance Squadron, the 25th Bombardment
Group (H), and the 40th Bombardment Group (M), which made
up the tactical component of the wing. The Army air garrison in
Puerto Rico was therefore not called upon at that time to assist in
establishing air defense units on other islands of the Caribbean.34
In Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, British Guiana, and the Bahamas,
Army engineers were constructing facilities a t each base to permit
operations by one heavy bombardment group and one long-range
reconnaissance squadron. An airfield in Trinidad was being furnished
with similar facilities, along with provisions for one interceptor pur-
suit group.35Bermuda, while not in the Caribbean area, was related
to both Caribbean and continental defense, and airfield construction
on the leased site was being designed to accommodate one composite
group of the AAF.36Accommodations a t the new bases did not neces-
sarily determine the size of garrisons, for tactical units were not
available in sufficient numbers to be stationed at all of the fields. The
approved peacetime garrisons called for one heavy bombardment
squadron and a group headquarters at Bermuda, an airways detach-
ment a t Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, and British Guiana, and a com-
posite wing of one heavy bombardment group, one pursuit group,
and one reconnaissance squadron at Trinidad. 3 7 Considerable impor-
tance was attached to early garrisoning of the Piarco airport at Trini-
dad. In the latter part of April 1941 a base force sailed from New
York, while an air contingent of some 400 officers and enlisted men
with six B-18A’s moved from the Canal Zone to Trinidad.3* In July
other Caribbean bases began to receive garrisons, when airways de-
tachments and infantry units were shipped from New York to British
Guiana and St. Lucia. Similar forces were sent to Antigua in Sep-
tember and to Jamaica in the following month.39
Despite the attention given to new bases, the Canal Zone continued
to be the focal point of Caribbean defenses. France Field on the
Atlantic side of the Zone and Albrook Field on the Pacific side were
162