The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
posts, all provided with telephone communications. But new airfields,
improvements in existing airfields, and large quantities of aircraft
warning equipment were required to complete the basic defense of
the island. For stations not immediately adjacent to seaports, the
supply problem was extremely difficult; there were no railroads, and
many roads were closed during the winter. Utilities such as electric
power and water were not available in sufficient quantities to supply
the needs of the armed forces. In spite of the necessarily slow devel-
opment of facilities, the first Army air units gained valuable experi-
ence in operating with the Royal Air Force at the Reykjavik and
Kaldadarnes airdromes. An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried out in accordance with pro-
cedures tested and established by the British during two years of war
against the Axis.28
In October, when weather conditions began to interfere seriously
with the operation of Navy patrol bombers in Iceland, the Chief of
the Army Air Forces directed that a heavy bombardment squadron
and the necessary service troops be sent immediately to Iceland, pre-
pared to operate in lieu of naval air forces in protection of shipping
as well as to operate in defense of the island.*’ The decision repre-
sented a great concession on the part of the AAF, for a t that time
the Air Force Combat Command had a total of only thirty-four heavy
bombers which were not earmarked for overseas stations and the
transfer of eight planes to Iceland would have left only twenty-six
heavy bombers in the United States. The proposed move was not
made because of the poor condition of runways and the lack of base
facilities in Iceland.30 Transfer of a medium bombardment squadron,
equipped with eighteen B-~sB’s,was being held up for the same rea-
sons, and the first week in December found the AAF seeking approval
of an extensive program of air base construction for Iceland. A study
of the situation indicated the desirability of sending a complete heavy
bombardment group to the island for operation against surface and
undersea craft in conjunction with the Navy and for protection of
shipping in the North Atlantic. There was likewise need for two
medium bombardment squadrons to collaborate in the work, espe-
cially prior to development of facilities for heavy bombers. Addition
of a pursuit group and construction of an air base on the east coast
of the island were regarded as essential to thorough defense opera-
tions, for German aircraft at that time could fly without too much
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