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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
in Greenland by this time, and two companies of aviation engineers
were hurriedly constructing the facilities necessary for air defense of
G~eenland.’~
American defense preparations in Iceland were accorded a degree
of urgency not given to those in Greenland, even though more than
2 5 , 0 0 0 British troops were protecting the island. On 5 July 1941
President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations, directed that one Army pursuit squadron
with the necessary maintenance and administrative detachments be
sent to Iceland as soon as practicable. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was
immediately prepared for shipment, and on 2 5 July the air echelon,
with thirty p-40’~and three primary training planes, boarded the
carrier W a s p a t Norfolk, Virginia. T w o days later an air base squad-
ron sailed from New York for Iceland, and American planes shortly
were operating from the Reykjavik airdrome in southwestern Iceland.
The air service contingent was augmented in November by 2 I officers
and 336 enlisted men from the First Air Force, comprising ordnance,
weather, aircraft warning, and materiel units.” American ground
forces were also arriving in Iceland, but complete relief of British
forces was not expected to be accomplished before May 1942; until
that time the defense of Iceland was the joint responsibility of all air,
ground, and naval forces stationed there.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in December 1941,American
forces in Iceland were operating under orders which stipulated that
the approach of any Axis forces to within fifty miles of the island
would be deemed “conclusive evidence of hostile intent” and would
justify attack by the American defenders. The mission of Army avia-
tion, operating under the Iceland Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and naval forces in offensive and defensive operations, aerial recon-
naissance and photographic operations, and transportation of supplies
and personnel. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was of course incapable of
carrying out all phases of the mission, and plans were being made for
shipment of a bombardment squadron, an observation squadron, and
an additional pursuit squadron.“
Reinforcement was delayed both by the shortage of trained squad-
rons in the United States and by the lack of proper aviation facilities
in Iceland. British forces had prepared two airfields for limited opera-
tions and had formed a coastal observation network of thirty-nine
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.